U.S. NSS 2025: Decoupling from South Asia Opportunities and Risks

One of the salient features of the ‘America First, ‘United States National Security Strategy 2025 [PDF]is the virtual disregard of the South Asian region, which had been a focus in the past, including in the NSS issued by the first administration under President Donald Trump.

There are justified concerns over what is seen as overlooking an important sub-regional complex, which has the potential for conflagration, including the presence of two nuclear-weapon states – India and Pakistan, which are in a No War and No Peace Posture.

The May 2025 Operation Sindoor, a four-day aerial skirmish has led to concerns of another conflict in the near future, with the trigger for the same being a terrorist attack assumed by India to be supported by Pakistan.

President Trump has not forsaken any opportunity to emphasise his personal role in bringing the two belligerents to ink a ceasefire, which India has vehemently denied, while Pakistan has espoused with equal vigour. The unstated consequence has been a warming of relations between Washington and Islamabad, and the pitching of Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal [promoted post-Operation Sindoor], as Mr Trump’s favourite general.

The consequence of Operation Sindoor has led to Pakistan moving the 27th Amendment of the Constitution and the operationalisation of the amendment to Article 243 of the Constitution which has resulted in the Army Chief wearing a dual hat of the Chief of Defence Forces and a virtual control of the country's nuclear weapons.

With the radical nationalist personality of General Asim Munir, which has a streak of “self-destructive aggressiveness,” there are concerns about a compressed escalation cycle that may lead to further escalation.

In such a scenario, external conflict-reduction influence becomes important, and despite India's rejection during Operation Sindoor, a role for the United States in any future scenario remains relevant.

In a wider time frame, apart from conflict de-escalation, there is a role for external powers, such as the United States, in bringing the two nuclear states – India and Pakistan – to moderate their intense strategic rivalry. This requires sustained engagement between the two sides and not just episodic intervention after the conflagration of a conflict. Given the numerous wars and strategic competition across multiple spheres, it is evident that the United States does not have the will or the diplomatic bandwidth for the arduous, perhaps thankless, task of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan, and the NSS has confirmed this approach.

In other ways, too, US disinterest in South Asia is not surprising, given that no other sub-regional complex has received attention in the NSS 2025 except the Middle East.

The focus of the NSS 2025, which is also a policy of the Trump administration, is on harnessing global resources and strengths for America's Interests.

In this context, South Asia, one of the least developed regions in the World, cannot be contributing much and receives no attention in the larger Trump administration's global and regional designs.

Resource scarcity in South Asia is endemic, given the acute distress of economies ranging from Pakistan to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to the Maldives, which are under varying International Monetary Fund [IMF] assistance programmes. With the US reducing aid, the field is now open to alternative investors, with China attempting to fill the gap.

Countries in South Asia are already heavily bound by Chinese debt, with loans the principal means Beijing uses to tie recipients into a long-term donor dependency relationship.

Then there is instabilty in South Asia evident given likely political developments in the region in 2026 as outlined in the annotated Map.

Apart from the risks, ranging from an India-Pakistan conflagration to an enhanced Chinese role in the region, there are opportunities as well for India, the primary power in the region, with a Neighbourhood First policy that gives primacy to South Asia.

As the US retreats, India can fill this space and offer an alternative to states in the region, both to America and to China.

This will, apart from relations with Pakistan, entail deploying soft power tools, including grants, loans, and aid, to prompt assistance in the case of natural calamities, such as Cyclone Ditwah in Sri Lanka recently.

There is also a concern over new anti India formulations within Bangladesh after the ouster of the Awami League government in August 2024, with the Interim Administration and possibly the post-polls government that may take office to adopt an aggressive approach towards New Delhi.

The absence of the US or other mediatory powers in the region may also provide India a motivation for direct engagement with Pakistan, despite the current nadir in the relationship. For this India will have to review strategy holistic enough and not restricted to countering terrorism from Pakistan. This is easier said than done for now and will remain academic exercise.

Finally, South Asia and India should take proper cues from the NSS, increase integration, and demonstrate a will to take the lead, as the NSS conveys.

Overall, South Asia should see the NSS's disregard as an opportunity.