The United States has strategic and integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region with a network of allies and partners which is a crucial advantage vis a vis China, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Navy Adm. John C. Aquilino outlined in a testimony at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on April 18.
The U.S. has five treaty allies in the region — Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and multiple partners.
"We are like-minded nations with common values. We have people-to-people ties, and that's beyond just the treaty allies," he said.
US DOD participates in around 120 exercises a year with allies and partners in the region, he said.
"That strategy and approach is competition, not containment," Aquilino said, referencing China.
"War is not inevitable, and it's not imminent. However, this decade presents a period of increased risk," he said.
Indeed, the assertions by Admiral Aquilino are eminently credible as China has been boxed in by many strategic alliances and partnerships, including India, that have been weaved around it.
The United States is also continuously expanding deterrence by building significant capabilities through pacts such as the AUKUS [Australia, U.K. and U.S.] to construct nuclear-powered submarines for Australia.
The U.S. is also committed to assisting in India's defence capability, including the ambition of Atma Nirbhar Bharat in Defence or indigenous defence production capabilities. However, only a few tangibles have been achieved in this domain due to several factors, including India's rumbling defence acquisition edifice and the challenge of technology transfer and costs of American equipment.
Nevertheless, in case of a crisis unfolding vis a vis China, sustained material support from the U.S. can be anticipated.
A moot question is whether the deterrence achieved by the United States in the Indo-Pacific assists India in dissuading China's Line of Control (LAC) or McMahon Line interventions.
The answer may be apparent in the negative – No.
Reasons for such an assumption are outlined below-
Firstly, the arc of U.S. deterrence geographically is mainly in the maritime sphere across the Indian and Western Pacific Ocean.
This would no doubt be effective in supporting Taiwan, for instance, or other South East Asian countries for their disputes over the South China Sea.
Geographically on India's Northern borders – China has an advantage in terms of the strategic partnership with Pakistan – all weather, higher than the mountains and deeper than the ocean variety.
Pakistan's Army Chief General Asim Munir is now visiting China, his first after taking over. He has visited the U.K. and Saudi Arabia so far.
The China-Pakistan axis creates the Two Front Conundrum for the Indian Armed Forces strategies that have been supposedly derived, but how effective these would remain to be seen.
Other states having a common border with China – Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar do not have the potential to dissuade Beijing and be of assistance to India.
Secondly, China is expected to keep the threshold of operations on the LAC below the level of an open conventional confrontation. Hence the U.S., while it has carried out several joint exercises, including that by special forces, will not have reason enough to jump to active military assistance of India.
Thirdly, counteractions in the Indo-Pacific maritime sphere will not be practicable due to restrictions of UNCLOS and the U.S. and partners' assertions for maintaining freedom of the seas.
Fourthly, while India has also built up parallel partnerships through multilateral forums and bilaterally in the Indo-Pacific, these will also need to be more effective.
QED – India must sustain deterrence on the LAC by tangibly strengthening combat power. While the deployment postures may seem adequate, envisaging the next step is the way ahead rather than expecting and fighting Chinese intrusions in 2023 on the same pattern as Galwan.
Such a scenario would require investments in ISR, realistic scenario building for generating viable combat options, forces deployment, reserves creation, logistics, and resupply on the Northern Front.
The exercise will prove challenging, mainly as concerns about the availability of significant assemblies and spares for Russian platforms have emerged.