War As We Don’t Know It Today

Multiple Characters of War - Image Generated by Gemini AI

General George S Patton, who distinguished himself at head of American field armies and specifically the tank corps during the Second World War named his biography, “War as I Knew It.” This covers numerous battle experiences during the Great War which by the time the US armed forces joined assumed a pattern focusing on land warfare with maneouvres, amphibious landings and pincers supported by close air support in North Africa and Europe the theatres where Patton distinguished himself. His contemporaries in those years were Montgomery and Rommel though of a different temperament. War was then relatively predictable and thus leadership and command made a difference a field in which all three generals mentioned distinguished themselves. Today’s wars have assumed a different character be it in Ukraine, West Asia [Middle East], Pakistan- Afghanistan, India-Pakistan or in Myanmar amongst other war zones.

The long experience of the United States and NATO has limited propensity to put, “boots on the ground,” so to say, thus the use of the land medium despite the much quoted maxim of “Multi Domain Operations” has been limited. There is a strong revulsion in democracies be it in the West or in India to human casualties. Limiting these has become a primary constant. It is not surprising that U.S. President Donald Trump despite the bombast against Iran did not land troops in the islands of the Persian Gulf in Iran. This demanded unrestricted use of strategic air power including drones and missiles in pulverising Iranian military as well as infrastructure targets including some unfortunate miscued attacks on children’s school. Many of these strikes may not stand the scrutiny of international laws of war, but that hardly concerned the United States leaders – political and military.

India followed the pattern of adopting what has come to be known as non- contact warfare, punitive strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir using preponderance of air, drone and missiles during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Arms acquisition programmes of the Indian military seem to indicate that this will remain the paradigm ahead which has also been adopted paradoxically by the Pakistan raising a Rocket Force.

Lo beholds Pakistan has employed the same design in what is claimed as terrorist presence in Afghanistan carrying out multiple air strikes which seem to have peaked in June with two major strikes on June 10/11 and 29/30. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as Taliban seeks to call itself claimed that the losses were mainly innocent civilians.

Yet some militaries have not been shy of launching ground operations – Russia being the biggest practitioner of the same in Ukraine. However, these have resulted in thousands of casualties both dead and wounded which has not deterred both sides in grinding assaults to seize or defend every inch of territory in various Oblasts in Ukraine. Here after the initial year of 2022 parity of combat power has led to a stalemate of sorts with focus shifting on long range drone and missile targets and infrastructure in depth areas such as oil refineries by Ukraine. A mix of contact and noncontact war continues.

Israel has also not been shy of using ground forces in Gaza and Southern Lebanon using superiority of firepower to cause what is being described as “rubbelisation,” of the urban zones in the theatres of war. The use of airpower has been significant in Myanmar by the Tatmadaw – Myanmar Armed Forces against the resistance – the People’s Defence Forces and Ethnic Armed Organisations where contact and noncontact is being mixed for coercion including of the civilian population.  What is of significance in this pattern of wars in todays context is variations based on choice made by the belligerents to achieve war objectives.

Where territory or space is not a demonstrable factor success is increasingly being determined by the narrative or the first salvo of ‘lies,’ and invectives against the adversary. Varied frameworks are being used to give a degree of sophistication to these narratives from –cognitive warfare to strategic communication projecting just use of force and cover up own losses while claiming a tactical if not total defeat of the enemy.

One common factor in all these wars is that the strategic objective has seldom been achieved, and the primary purpose for which force was employed as a tool for politics by other means has remained unfulfilled.

Thus, the next War will be “As We Don’t Know It”. Despite the same the futility of use of force remains unacknowledged and diplomacy as a tool to resolve inter and intra state conflicts is sparsely used. Who has benefited from these wars is unclear but the suffering of the people of nations at war and beyond remains unacknowledged as the demands on military leaders today directing wars on glittering screens in armchair comfort is far from what made Patton, Montgomery and Rommel the great leaders they are.