Iran Regime Crisis, Stability and United States Options

Iran Flag Source Wikimedia Commons

Simulating the State of play in Iran with protests curbed with heavy casualties, possibility of immediate US intervention receding and the way ahead for the regime.

Iran's protests and government crackdown from December 28 last year to January 17th have led to an ‘official’ tally of approximately 5,000 people killed as per Reuters report quoting sources.  The protests and ‘rioting,’ has stopped for now and normalcy is returning to the streets. U.S. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, seems to have stepped back from threats of  military intervention.

What has clearly come is regime legitimacy due to multiple factors while control by employing the power of the Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps [IRGC] has been feasible, regaining acceptability is an upfill if not impossible task for now unless there is willingness to change.

Loss of regime legitimacy arises from multiple factors which are not only economic and include political factors such as corruption and asymmetric domination of the Establishment that is the IRGC, differential standards and norms for the public and the governing class, clerical legacy in governance and control.

A primary factor is the economy. Elite capture of economic resources is perceived to be the main reason for angst in the public including the all-important Bazaaris. The Bazaaris are the mercantile class who control market and thus the economic resources that flow into the country’s economy. Once the Bazaaris saw that the preferential exchange rate was put into place on 28 December last year, the eruption was mainly due to the concessions cornered by the companies established by the IRGC.

The Bazaaris are pragmatic and can align with the regime that will benefit their economic and trade interests which is why they put their faith in the clergy, but when their interests were impacted walked out on the clerics.

The anger against the regime was also seen in 2018-19 when the purported benefits from the JCPOA was not transferred to the public but most was transferred to the IRGC. These were the first protests against the Islamic Republic system as such which were sustained post the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini related protests.

The first set of protests in 2009 broke out in Iran in 2009 which were mainly against a flawed election that saw Mousavi and Karoubi being denied a rightful vote seen stolen by Mahmud Ahmedineajad.

Thus, it would be seen that the frequency of protests has increased from 2009 to 2018-19, 2022-23 and now in 2025. From four years the compression of protests now is two years and in case the key economic issue are not resolved to the satisfaction of the masses, may breakout as early as within six months to a year.

The political protests also have an element of a generational shift but presently there is no clarity on identification of a Gen Z in Iran and their leadership.

Those youth aligned with the Basij and the IRGC are the main beneficiaries.

The legitimacy of the IRGC and the Pasdaran or the Iranian armed forces came up for question during the 12 day war in June 2025 where Israel and the US pulverised the country with missiles including targeting of four nuclear facilities which have now been converted into a rubble.

Given this situation the vulnerability of the regime is seen at the highest today.

But collapse could be avoided through sustained strong arm action by the IRGC and Basij regardless of the loss of lives.

At the same time direct intervention by the United States will in fact facilitate the regime  to win back legitimacy.

It is not surprising that Ayatollah Khamanei and key  Iranian Officials – the trio of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei have blamed United States and Israel for the rioting including the loss of lives.

As of now the US is opting for indirect pressure by tightening sanctions and how far China in particular will go along remains to be seen, however economic deprivation can be managed only  if there is a compromise with the United States on the nuclear enrichment impasse else the next wave of protests is inevitable.

U.S and Israeli military intervention would require extensive planning. The primary factor is the ability of the United States and Israel to take out Iranian ballistic missile hubs which are likely to be deep underground.  While the nuclear plants were taken out at possibly similar or deeper depth, intelligence may be limited constraint which has led to restraint for the time being.

It is not surprising Gulf Arabs and Turkey amongst others came out strongly against a military operation by the United States.

Moreover, unleashing a Kurdish uprising in Iran would be a concern for Iraq and Turkey as well.

Once the US can assure that Iranian capabilities to carry out retaliatory attacks at American bases in the Middle East has been neutered a revival of a non-contact military option could be likely.

Apart from avoiding regional escalation, concerns arise of impact on global energy security which may be another restraining factor.

Moreover, there is no reasonable alternative in place in case the clerical order under Khamanei collapses.  

The monarchists led by Reza Pahlavi may appear attractive and generate a lot of social media interest, but the ability to rally the Iranians appears to be limited for now. Thus, regime collapse leading to chaos is a scenario that the United States may have possibly avoided by any impetuous actions.

What this implies is that the United  States and Israel will continue to look for options to effect, a regime change in Iran. Execution will come about only when the risks of regional escalation and global energy impact and economic fracture is manageable with a possible framework of alternative order in Tehran visible.