India Defence: Lessons from Saudi Houthi clashes in September 2026

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Seven lessons from the ongoing Saudi Houthi conflagration for the Indian military from relevance of the Sudarshan Chakra mission to over reliance on air, missile and drone operations, significance of the land medium in a multi domain war scenario and the eternal truism of surprise in warfare and more.

The rapid conflagration between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s opposition group, Ansarullah, also known as the Houthis, in September 2026  has raised an alarm. These clashes are a part of the overall U.S./Israel and Iran War commencing on 28 February and continuing as a hurting contestation in the Straits of Hormuz. That there would be an escalation by the Houthis to block Bab el-Mandeb, the second channel of energy flows impacting Saudi Arabia and passing through the Suez Canal, was anticipated; however, the on-again, off-again approach of the U.S. Iran war had possibly led to a degree of complacency and thus the Houthi attack breaking the truce in place since 2022 came as a surprise.

The Houthis gained major ground along Yemen’s western coast, especially Mocha, Bab al‑Mandeb, and multiple Red Sea islands, brushing aside Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) government and allied resistance forces.

Houthi forces also launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Saudi cities including Abha, Khamis Mushait, Taif, Jazan, Najran, Yanbu, and Riyadh, wounding civilians and damaging energy facilities.

Saudi Arabia in turn responded with multiple air strikes, at least 300 [till Sep 19] across Taiz, Marib, al‑Jawf, al‑Bayda, and Yemen’s Red Sea coast, targeting Houthi bases and infrastructure.

The clashes have affected Red Sea shipping, disrupted Saudi oil pipelines, halted operations at energy facilities, and pushed oil prices above $100 a barrel.

What are the major lessons to be drawn from these for India amongst other global and regional stakeholders in stability – energy, economy and security?

Firstly, a truce remains as such and does not imply that hostilities will not be restarted and the situation escalate by the adversary – in this case the Houthis, who claim independence but are said to be a part of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance. That the Houthis launched operations just as Iran threatened to break the blockade by US forces in the Straits of Hormuz by expanding regionally denotes that this was not a coincidence and could have been anticipated.

Secondly, the IRG and local resistance forces on the ground collapsed in the face of rapid, highly lethal ground combat operations due to a lack of adequate support from the Saudis and other stakeholders in stability. Excessive dependence on air and missile power may have played a role.

Thirdly, the much vaunted Mecca Joint Defence Alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, announced on August 07, failed to provide any relief to Riyadh even though there appears to be a clause in the same which has been stated as: ' an attack against one is an attack against all ’. So far, Turkey and Pakistan have restricted themselves with statements and diplomatic outreach to Iran to rein in the Houthis. The United States guarantees to the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, which had been achieved at enormous costs for the Kingdom, also failed as President Donald Trump declined to come to the assistance of Riyadh.

Fourth, from a military perspective, the limits of air, missile, and drone power were apparent, as the Houthi onslaught on the southern open terrain off the Red Sea could rapidly overwhelm a weak ground force. To retake these areas, a ground offensive is the answer, and while Saudi Arabia may not have the numbers, others such as Pakistan and Turkey are unwilling to take up the challenge despite the pledge to the Mecca Alliance.

Fifthly, air and missile defence is as significant as strike systems. India’s Sudarshan Chakra mission, announced by Prime Minister Mr Narendra Modi on August 15 last year, is notable. However, to protect against multiple vulnerabilities, particularly energy and defense infrastructure, there is a long way to go. By contrast, Pakistan or China in Tibet have no comparable criticalities that could lead to comparative losses.

Sixthly, asymmetry, including forces, weapons and economies, has a role to play in war today. The Houthis have no economic or energy targets worth the name. Still, for Riyadh, the multiple energy hubs and vital economic infrastructure can be targeted through air and missile attacks, causing extensive losses and creating a strategic discontinuity for Riyadh.

Seventhly, surprise is still a critical element in war – be it of the past, the present or the future. A nation with aggressive adversaries such as India cannot afford to let its guard down in any sphere, from a terrorist attack such as Pahalgam or a clash at sea or a Galwan – armed forces in particular need to remember the adage – eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.