12 Initial Observations on Operation Sindoor and Pak Response

While lessons from Operation Sindoor will take some time to distil, yet there is a need for some initial observations from political and military objectives to conduct of operations and criticality of systems based on the available information so far.

Here is a look at 12 observations that made a difference-

As of now skirmishes between Indian and Pakistan armed forces have subsided though tensions continue given the lack of trust between the militaries due to violation of Cease Fire from time to time.

A degree of stabilization may be achieved during the telephonic conversation between the two DGMOs scheduled at 1200 hours today [12 May 2025].

While it may be too early to draw any lessons from Operation Sindoor and the Pakistani response given Indian contention is that Sindoor is continuing and will also imply an immediate response to any terrorist attack supported by Pakistani, it is apparent that some initial observations can be made over the four nights skirmishing from 06 May to 10 May.

Firstly, the eternal lesson that war is politics by military means holds good. India responded to Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Pahalgam terror attack by employing punitive strikes as an option which appears to be the default one for the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The success of Operation Sindoor would imply that this option will be sustained in the future.

Secondly, India has succeeded in the war objective of targeting terrorists as well as infrastructure across the Line of Control as well as the International Border. Some 100 terrorists including some key leaders have been killed in these attacks. The level of destruction is clear from the images shown by the Director General of Air Operations Air Marshal AK Bharti during the briefing on 11 May.

That Pakistan had the temerity to send serving military officers in uniform to attend the cremation of some of these terrorists is an indication that those killed were in the top hierarchy.

Was Pakistani objective achieved is not clear due to lack of insight in what the same was, apart from bringing Kashmir to international attention and seek mediation with the US administration under President Donald Trump jumping into the opportunity. The cost paid may have been too heavy,

Three, Pahalgam terrorist attack as Pulwama in 2019 indicates the short window that is available for a retributive operation against Pakistan post a terrorist attack.

The cycle of escalation in the case of Pulwama lasted approximately four days. In the case of Pahalgam as well it was again the same four nights and four days to be precise from the night of May 06/07 to May 10 when cease fire was accepted by 1700 hours though not fully implemented.

Most analysts in India believe that these skirmishes though having caused extensive damage to Pakistan including the terrorist network that it has spawned over the years, is unlikely to prevent support to terrorism in Kashmir and beyond.

Do we then face another Pulwama and Pahalgam in the near future, for while there has been extensive claims by the United States of having mediated a cease fire and subsequent bilateral talks at a neutral venue, it is uncertain whether there would be any commitment by Pakistan to abdicate terrorism as a strategy against India whose political, diplomatic and economic strength is growing from day to day.

For Pakistan, Kashmir will remain, “jugular vein,” as the Army Chief General Asim Munir said most recently prior to Pahalgam.

Thus, another terrorist attack is a distinct possibility in the future, while for India a retributive response is inevitable. In such a scenario a short window of opportunity is a given due to nuclear overhang.

India will have to prepare the armed forces to achieve the objectives and cause maximum damage to the Pakistani terrorist infrastructure in the future. For this the most important assets will be technical and human intelligence. Developing a continuous picture of the terrorists’ hubs on the other side of the hill so to say assumes importance.

The sensor shooter interface will be complete with long range standoff weapons which can cause heavy destruction and can penetrate even bunkers. For the next time Pak terrorist leaders may go literally underground to escape retribution.

Till such time India develops indigenous capabilities in this sphere imports will remain the main option.

Fourth Armed UAVs will remain another acquisition as was demonstrated by what can be seen as the first operation in which both sides used multiple types of drones to good effect.

While it would be difficult to evaluate the performance of the systems employed due to lack of adequate information India will have to continue to depend on imports till such time an indigenous armed UAV is developed and fielded and not just assembled based on technology provided from abroad.

Fifthly the Line of Control [LoC] has proved to be a trip wire and red line which both sides did not cross but for launching of UAVs and missiles.

In such a scenario ground operations seem to be passe and thus aerospace power to include satellites, drones and manned fighters will remain the preferred option. UAVs will be employed by the three services the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

Adequate standoff weapons need to be acquired for manned fighters to enable launch while staying outside the range of Pakistan or Chinese air to air missiles.

Sixthly the level of jointness in operations and planning and the role of HQ Integrated Defence Staff in Operation Sindoor is unclear for now, but hopefully while coordination of the operations seems to have been excellent, it remains to be seen how far the planning was joint.

Seventhly the role of integrated air defence has come out very clearly and the capabilities provided by the Russian S 400 – named Sudarshan Chakra by India for target acquisition and as a part of the air defence command centre apart from independent engagement of multiple offensive air elements.

Eighthly networking of assets spread over a large geographic spectrum emerged as a key factor in successful countering of the multiple swarm drones launched from Pakistan over three nights

The Indian Air Force integrated air command and control system IACCS being pivotal to the same.

Ninthly what triggered an alert in the United States leading to attempts to calm down the crisis will emerge more clearly in the days ahead. But the possible triggering of one of the famous Khalid Kidwai, doyen of Pak strategic red lines that is threat to military assets could be a possible one but needs further investigation.

Tenthly in a hyper nationalist environment, misinformation and disinformation will dominate. In the present multimedia milieu where traditional and social outlets and messaging apps are competing against each other, building greater public awareness remains the option ahead.

Eleventhly operational consideration in the future would have to take into account the safety of civilians in the border zone which will be invariably targeted by Pakistan to spread fear.

Finally, national unity was evident for the first time after many years as the government and the opposition spoke in the same tune, this may be crisis driven but raises hopes of a unified response ahead, though how long will the consensus last before questions emerge remain to be seen?

A disclaimer, there are many more important observations that can be made from which in the future lessons can be drawn, after more information is available.