Post Op Sindoor 1 – Countering New Form of Two Front Collusive Threat

Op Sindoor saw a new form of the much heralded two front collusive threat from Pakistan and China apart from other state actors as Turkey manifesting. India will need to review the national security response [strategy] to meet the emerging challenge.

Backdrop

The Statement by Director, Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse, U.S. Air Force  to the United States Armed Services Sub Committee on Intelligence and Special Operations House of Representatives prepared using information available as of 11 May 2025 that is a day after India and Pakistan agreed for a cease fire in the ongoing Operation Sindoor stated that while, “India views China as its primary adversary and Pakistan more an ancillary security problem to be managed, despite cross-border attacks in mid-May by both India’s and Pakistan’s militaries”.

There is an underlying distinction in the adversary’s in terms of their threat potential by the Director DIA, but it is very clearly evident that India will have to prepare in the immediate term for miliary response to Pak’s terror attacks and a long term to face the burgeoning and rapidly modernising People’s Liberation Army. [PLA].

Here is a detailed review why-

Pakistan

On Pakistan section just as for India Director DIA said that, “Pakistan regards India as an existential threat and will continue to pursue its military modernization effort, including the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage”.

Further elaborating on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal General Kruse stated, “Pakistan is modernizing its nuclear arsenal and maintaining the security of its nuclear materials and nuclear command and control. Pakistan almost certainly procures WMD- applicable goods from foreign suppliers and intermediaries”.

On the prognostication for Pakistan in the future he said, “During the next year, the Pakistani military’s top priorities are likely to remain cross-border skirmishes with regional neighbors [ Editor note including India and Afghanistan and possibly Iran], rising attacks by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Baloch nationalist militants, counterterrorism efforts, and nuclear modernization”.

Developments after May 11, wherein Indian Prime Minister declared a shift in counter terrorism policy from that of punitive deterrence to compellance was obviously not factored in in the DIA Statement.

Pakistan Army’s triumphalism post India Operation Sindoor most visibly manifesting in the elevation of the Army Chief General Asim Munir to the rank of Field Marshal would also have to be considered in Pakistan’s future military response.

For Munir now any setback on the military front with India will be personally unacceptable and sans any political checks may drive him to the irrationality of premature use of the nuclear option even though Indian Prime Minister has very clearly indicated that Delhi will not be moved by nuclear ‘blackmail’.

Moreover, Pakistan’s counter terror strategy now includes an anti-India information dimension in that every terrorist attack or even a counter terror operation in Balochistan in particular is being outlined in the statements on the same by DGISPR as “terrorists supported by India.”

India will have to factor in these new developments in the military preparations vis a vis Pakistan with Op Sindoor still ongoing.

China

On the Chinese front as well, the developments are alarming but in an extended timeframe.

As the Director DIA remarks, “China is rapidly advancing its military modernization and developing capabilities across all warfare domains that could enable it to seize Taiwan by force, to better project power in the western Pacific, and to disrupt U.S. attempts to maintain presence or intervene in conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s leaders are stressing the imperative of meeting key military transformation targets set for 2027 and 2035”.

Indeed, rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, the Navy and the Air Force along with the Strategic forces in multiple dimensions from Rocket to  Space and Cyber should be a marker for India of new levels of threat that would be posed.

China’s ambition of domination of the regional periphery militarily is just two years away, with Beijing having made new security inroads in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

The Director DIA has highlighted India’s dissuasive strategy vis a vis China by “advancing its bilateral defense partnerships in the Indian Ocean region through exercises, training, arms sales, and information sharing. India also has increased trilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and actively participates in multilateral fora such as the Quadrilateral, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN”.

New Form of Two Front Collusive Threat

A review of the statement by US Director DIA and developments post Operation Sindoor would indicate that, India is evidently facing a new form of, “Two Front Collusive Threat,” a phrase frequently used in the strategic lexicon.

Pakistan may opt to carry out terrorist attacks despite the clearly stated response by the Indian Prime Minister Mr Narendra Modi.

Even in the unlikely circumstance that it does not, India will have to prepare for a devastating conventional punitive response to undeniable destruction to Pakistan’s military and strategic infrastructure below the nuclear threshold. This will be a challenge given the ‘Asim Munir factor,’ as explained earlier.

China will actively support Pakistan to counter an Indian threat not just by providing weapons and equipment but by assisting in networking the, ‘kill chai,’ which is evident based on lessons of Operation Sindoor.

On the military front China’s strategy will be the Sun Tzu maxim, “Winning without Fighting”.

Strategic encirclement of India in the region, ‘salami slicing,’ on the Northern front a term used for provocative intrusions to keep India engaged while expanding maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region through not just the PLA Navy but other non state flotillas will be parts of the schema.

India will have to adopt an innovative security approach to manage these challenges just short of war.

At the same time, medium to long term plan of modernization of the armed forces need to be sustained and accelerated which is a function of India’s squeaky acquisition system with some back of the envelope estimates of some 200 boxes to be ticked by different military and civilian officials before a weapon system can be bought.

For all this a much-needed National Security Strategy or even a Policy as the Indian hierarchy is severely contemptuous of the term ‘strategy’ needs to be in the official if not a public domain.