Operation Sindoor 2: The Dilemma of Defining “Success” and Options

Three options for prosecution of Operation Sindoor 2 which can emphatically denote success of the Indian Armed Force beyond the narrative common in today’s war, discussed.

Amidst the nationalist fervour on the first anniversary of Operation Sindoor, which extends from 06 to 10 May, the need to keep an “eye on the ball”, so to speak, assumes importance, particularly given the determination that Sindoor is not a one-off but a continuum.

This is neither new nor surprising, given that Indian operations in Jammu and Kashmir in the past have lasted for decades.

Operation Rakshak, for example, had several series I, II and so on. The difference in connotation of Operation Sindoor is that of a punitive cross-border strike, which will include the military as well as terrorist targets in Pakistan.

Given the declared intention, strategic surprise may have been lost, but the selection of time and space would still provide enough options for deception and keep the adversary on its toes.

Moreover preparatory action to ensure success of Sindoor 2, can be undertaken.

Defining “success” in a manner that leads the adversary to accept defeat is important in the context of contemporary the fuzziness of this term in the ongoing wars wherein both sides claim victory.

For instance, in Ukraine, while Russia claims to have captured approximately 20 per cent of Ukraine's territory or 120,000 square kms over the past four years, human losses killed, wounded and missing have been over 1 million.

Perhaps no other country could absorb losses at such a scale, yet the war remains a stalemate. The economic, political and diplomatic costs are also enormous.

On the other front is the US-Iran war, where, again, both sides claim success almost daily.

Yet, the United States is far away from the political objective of a regime change in Iran and may also not have destroyed Iran’s nuclear weapons potential to an assured degree.

Destruction of Iran’s military capabilities has no doubt been achieved but the consequence is Iran’s  control of maritime traffic through the Straits of Hormuz blockade.

And the net loss for Iran as a nation is, by its own estimate, $275 billion, but could be far greater, and rebuilding could take decades.

The United States' global prestige has been significantly affected, leading German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to term it ‘humiliation,’ perhaps a diplomatic faux pas but accepted by many as a reality.

So defining success and then achieving it in Operation Sindoor 2 is essential.

The aim of Op Sindoor 1 was to cause substantial neutralisation of the two top terrorist groups sponsored by Pakistan – Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was achieved to a substantial degree.

Questions will remain, however, about sustainability of this success as reports indicate that the infrastructure destroyed has been rebuilt.

Anticipating the same, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had declared that Operation Sindoor would continue to send a message of an assured punitive strike in the case of another  terrorist attack in J & K or Indian soil.

Yet such a punitive strike as and when it manifests needs to lead to a change of behaviour of the Pakistan Army in terms of abdication of support to terror.

Such a transformation is possible and has occurred in the past, most notably after Operation Vijay 71, the war for the Liberation of Bangladesh, and Operation Parakram, the year-long Indian military mobilisation between December 2001 and October 2002.

Pakistan Army had suffered huge losses during these operations.

1971 case is well known; the 10-month-long confrontation had also exhausted Pakistan's army resources, with artillery stocks at new lows, apart from other factors.

Operation Sindoor 2, due to the inherent necessity of preventing impact on the economy, may be short.

Thus achieving a transformation in the Pakistan military behaviour in terms of support to terrorism will require breaking the aura of infallibility, created by the Army post-Op Sindoor 1, internally and amongst some supporters abroad, is feasible and an objective worth consideration.

One option is inflicting substantial material losses on the military through a short and sharp campaign of destruction launched by air and missile barrages, taking out key strategic but non- nuclear assets of the military, which, for obvious reasons, are not defined herein.

The blow will have to be crippling, denying the military an opportunity to launch a counteroffensive.

The absence of Pak retaliation or a weak riposte will determine success.

Such a massive campaign of destruction will require extensive accumulation of munitions assets. Operation Sindoor 1 munitions and replacement costs are estimated at $3 billion based on Emergency Procurement planned post-ceasefire. In the scenario envisaged, ballpark figures could well necessitate two to three times more investment in the missile and bomb arsenal.

A second option is ‘land grab’ in key strategic areas on the Line of Control and the IB or International Border if necessary. Again, specific objectives are left undefined, the seizure of which would clearly define success through occupation and holding of territory. This should be seen as loss of strategic, vital ground to Pakistan.

A third alternative is elimination of a series of Pakistan Army post used as terrorist launch pads on the Line of Control, which are well known.

Conducted across the front with artillery and missile attacks supporting assault troops where necessary, the signal will be unmistakable.

Clearly, there could be others which the operational creative minds of the newly formed or forming tri-services Joint Operations Control Centre (JOCC) would be evaluating each day.

Whatever be the option employed, the success will have to be demonstrative leading to capitulation of the adversaries will  beyond the ‘spin, or ‘narrative’ inevitable in warfare today.