Op Sindoor 2: Nine New Variables and One Constant

What’s changed between Op Sindoor 1 and a projected Operation Sindoor 2 – here is a review of nine variables - strategic, diplomatic, military and terrorism which are likely to change and one constant.

India’s declaration that Operation Sindoor is continuing coming from the highest executive authority of the country, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was more than a notice to Pakistan, it was a signal to the armed forces to be ready for another round of “skirmish,” with the Western adversary.

Whether Sindoor 2 will take the same form of a non-contact, standoff punitive engagement is unclear for now, the ongoing Iran US War could have reinforced the concept.

On the other hand, there is a view expressed by the Indian Army that success in war can only be determined by territory - conquest or loss. This is a truism in warfare in this decade wherein both sides claim victory as it was also the case for Operation Sindoor 1 which had led to a huge debate in India for effective strategic communication to portray success.

What ever be the operational choices made by the military commanders and endorsed by the political leadership, there are multiple factors that will impact Operation Sindoor 2, here is a brief review of the same.

Firstly, the strategic and operational contours of Operation Sindoor 2, were outlined by Prime Minister Narendra Modi almost immediately after termination of the conflict on May 10.

Briefly stated the Prime Minister made three salient points – “First, If there is a terrorist attack on India, a fitting reply will be given. We will give a befitting response on our terms only. We will take strict action at every place from where the roots of terrorism emerge”.  “Secondly, India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail. India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail”.  “Thirdly, we will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism. During Operation Sindoor the world has again seen the ugly face of Pakistan, when top Pakistani army officers came to bid farewell to the slain terrorists. This is strong evidence of state-sponsored terrorism.”

An important distinction made from the previous operation is that Pakistan’s armed forces will also be seen as legitimate target for punitive strikes given involvement of the Deep State in supporting terrorism Pan India.

This would remove some of the restrictions that some observers have claimed the armed forces had to operate in May 2025 as in the initial phase Pakistan’s A2AD assets were not included in the target plan, though the armed forces commanders themselves have denied any such constraint imposed by the government.

Deriving from the above emerges the second factor wherein operational surprise will assume importance as the strategic response by India has been declared almost a year ago, for success without facing major losses plans will have to factor in time, space, technology, force application and so on which can ensure maximum effects against an enemy that is well prepared.

It is also in this context that a land based rather than purely aerial standoff skirmishing may also come into play.

Third factor is the trigger for launch. Post Pahalgam, Pakistan is expected to have changed the overall strategy of sponsoring terrorism in India from proxies mainly citizens of the country to more Kashmiri or even Indian citizens.

It is unclear if there are any linkages with Pakistan with the so called, “white collar network,’ involved in the Delhi Terrorist Incident of 10 November last year. Yet Indian reaction to the same would have highlighted the way ahead to ISI’s proxy terror cell operatives.

Moreover, the Indian Army post Pahalgam 2025 has launched extensive search and destroy and seeking encounter missions in the Jammu region clearing residual terrorist cells thus the possibility of another major attack at least for the near future in J & K appears to be limited.

It is unclear why the Army did not launch such operations in 2024 – 25 and prior with clear indicators of small highly trained Pak terrorist cells possibly some led by the SSG active in the Jammu belt but that is for another day.

The Fourth factor will be an assessment of the international environment for accepting a cross-border operation possibly resulting in escalation into the nuclear domain. While India has time and again stated that it would not be restricted by what is claimed as the ‘nuclear bluff,’ non-proliferation states and actors are no doubt likely to worry of an escalation into the “unknown,” with Pakistan obviously playing up this scenario.

Fifthly Pakistan has an elevated international profile projected as a mediator in the Iran and US War which the World is keen to see an end to.

Whether Pakistan succeeds in this role or not is not material, but it has generated sufficient heft in the international community which will challenge India to create opinion in its favour in case of a cross-border operation.

Sixthly linked to the above is the special relationship between the US President Donald Trump and Pakistan military and civilian leadership with Chief of Defence Force Field Marshal Asim Munir named as, ‘my favourite general,’ by Mr Trump many times over. Linked with Mr Trump’s penchant for bringing closure to regional conflict not withstanding US launch of war with Iran, there would be immense pressure on New Delhi to avoid military escalation in the wake of any terrorist incident in the country where needle of suspicion points towards Pakistan.

Seventhly China will continue to remain a silent yet highly consequential actor in any India Pakistan military exchange providing vital strategic intelligence as well as weapons and munition support as it did in Op Sindoor 1. Possibly Beijing may increase the factor of overt deniability this time around.

A military factor [eight] is unity of command in Pakistan with Chief of Defence Force and Army Chief combined bestowed on Field Marshal Asim Munir. This will be an advantage in response by the armed forces and while the Pakistan Army has always been seen as in de facto command of the three services including the Air Force and the Navy, now a de jure control has been established including the strategic forces which come directly under the CDF.

Pakistan will be tempted to strike at civilian infrastructure including economic and energy though this is clearly seen as a war crime.

Ninthly, concomitantly the military command hierarchy in India in the coming six months will be in transition as all the service chiefs and the Chief of Defence Staff are due for super annuation. While there is likely to be a smooth changeover, the new commanders will be facing a test by fire at the outset.

Finally, one constant between Operation Sindoor 1 and 2 will be duration of the skirmish which will be limited. Many factors indicate the same apart from the nuclear, the high cost of wars today, estimated $ 3 Billion for India for emergency procurements post Op Sindoor 1 and the need to sustain momentum of Viksit Bharat 2047.