Min Aung Hlaing: The “Battle” for Legitimacy

From Senior General and Commander of the Armed Forces to President, Min Aung Hlaing may have achieved his life time ambition, but legitimacy issues will continue to inhibit his acceptance politically as well as diplomatically despite an outreach by some regional countries.

International Recognition. Myanmar’s ongoing civil war is intensifying, as is the political battle internally and externally for legitimacy. On one side of the divide is now President and former armed forces commander Min Aung Hlaing, who has fulfilled his ambition of becoming head of the country which is claimed to be one of the reasons the military coup launched five years ago. Despite manipulating his way to the Presidency through a sham election, the Min Aung Hlaing-led government is struggling to gain legitimacy. The election and subsequent inauguration of Min Aung Hlaing as president in April 2026 were widely dismissed by the international community and UN experts as a sham, organised to solidify military rule rather than representing a democratic process. The exclusion of major political parties marked the vote and took place amidst widespread civil war. The United Nations has not officially recognised Min Aung Hlaing as the president of Myanmar, despite his recent swearing-in ceremony. In an updated list of heads of state and foreign ministers released by the UN Department of General Assembly and Conference Management (DGACM) on 13 April, the global body reaffirmed its recognition of the pre-coup leadership. According to the official UN designation, Win Myint remains the President of Myanmar, while State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi continues to be listed as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This may seem like tokenism to some, but for the newly anointed President, it is a major setback despite the strong backing of two permanent members of the UN Security Council - China and Russia. Yes, these have recognised Ming Aung Hlaing as the President and sent top officials for the swearing in ceremony.

Regional Recognition

Acceptance by the regional countries remains a question mark. This despite a special visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, whose trip to Naypyitaw is expected shortly. Two sides discussed “Pauk‑Phaw” (fraternal) relations. Vice Chairman of the Political Consultative Conference of China, the Speaker of Belarus’s House of Representatives, the Vice Speaker of Russia’s State Duma, Cambodia’s special representative to ASEAN, India’s Ministry of State for External Affairs and Thailand’s former deputy prime minister and foreign minister attended the swearing in. China has moved quickly to deepen ties, dispatching a stream of delegates to Naypyitaw and Yangon. Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow visited Naypyitaw for talks with Myanmar’s new military-led government.

Regional countries are engaging with Min Aung Hlaing administration as they did during the military rule before, based on their economic, trade and security interests rather than questioning the legitimacy of the election process. Importantly, none of these questions addresses the gross violations of human rights, including the air bombardment of civilians.

Thailand’s indirect recognition of Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency reflects a mix of border‑driven pragmatism and ASEAN’s internal divisions. Thailand does not want instability on another border after the clashes with Cambodia. Thailand prioritises border stability, given the long, conflict‑affected frontier where refugee flows, armed‑group activity, and cross‑border trade require cooperation with whoever holds power in Myanmar. ASEAN remains split: some members push for isolating the junta, while others—Thailand included—argue that engagement is necessary because punitive approaches have not shifted the situation. . Min Aung Hlaing’s move to assume a “civilian” presidency has, according to commentary, provided a pretext for some ASEAN states to deepen engagement, further exposing divisions within the bloc over how to handle Myanmar’s crisis. On the other hand, Indonesia's court has accepted the genocide complaint against Min Aung Hlaing

Political Legitimacy.

President Min Aung Hlaing, newly elevated to the presidency by the installed Union Parliament, has filled all state and regional chief minister posts with former military and police officers, further tightening his control over the country’s administrative structure. The National Unity and Peace-making Central Committee (NSPCC), chaired by the junta President Min Aung Hlaing, was established. Similarly, the National Solidarity and Peace-making Working Committee (NSPWC), chaired by Vice President Nyo Saw, and the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiating Committee (NSPNC), chaired by Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae, were formed respectively. The occupation of key ministerial posts in Myanmar's union and state governments by the military (Tatmadaw) and its proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), following staged elections, serves to formalise and institutionalise military rule under a civilian façade. Still, the question of political legitimacy is linked to international and regional recognition, as well as to broad internal acceptance.

Towards this end, the military is attempting to portray a soft image. To mark Myanmar's New Year’s Day on 17 April 2026, the military-led administration has granted amnesty to 4,353 prisoners from facilities across the country. Last elected president, U Win Myint, was freed under a traditional New Year amnesty after more than five years in junta detention. On release from prison, he insisted he had broken no laws. The regime has also reportedly trimmed the sentence of 80‑year‑old Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and shifted her to house arrest. Acting President Duwa Lashi La of the National Unity Government (NUG) has issued a high-profile demand for the immediate and unconditional release of State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint, and all political prisoners on 16 April.

Min Aung Hlaing used his first cabinet meeting to invite ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) to join peace talks within 100 days urging PDFs to “enter the legal fold” and EAOs—both signatories and non‑signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)—to hold talks before July 31. National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar’s parallel government, widely regarded as the driving force of the Spring Revolution and which commands PDFs was not mentioned. Domestically, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) have accepted the new regime, mainly under Chinese pressure and continue their trade and economic activities in the border areas.

Among NCA signatories are the Karen National Union (KNU), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, KNU/KNLA‑Peace Council, Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO), Arakan Liberation Party, Lahu Democratic Union, All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF) and Restoration Council of Shan State. Since the 2021 coup, KNU, CNF and ABSDF have declared the NCA void and resumed armed struggle against the military. A faction of the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) is also fighting the regime in Shan State.  Non‑signatories to the NCA include the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), United Wa State Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Arakan Army (AA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, of which only the KIA and AA are actively fighting the regime.

Most major ethnic armed groups are unlikely to take up the junta’s 100-day offer, as leading organisations have already rejected it and view the initiative as insincere. These groups argue that the junta’s offer merely repackages the discredited Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and fails to offer meaningful political concessions. They emphasise their goal of a federal democratic system free from military influence, making talks under current conditions unacceptable.

Importantly, military continued scorched-earth rampage through the Bamar heartland regions of Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay, killing civilians and burning houses, thus acceptance of the offer for talks may not invite confidence in the Spring Revolution force.