When India first outlined the nuclear doctrine in a press release of the Cabinet Committee on Security of meeting chaired by the then Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee on January 04, 2003, there was much relief given the clear articulation of the employment of nuclear weapons.
No First Use [NFU] policy – with China being the only other nuclear weapons power to have made such a determination indicated a political purpose for the atomic bomb rather than a warfighting tool. India’s commitment to NFU has been questioned by the non-proliferation purists.
Over the years the facet of “credible minimum deterrent,” and, retaliation that is “massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage,” are the more debated issues particularly in the context of the emerging strategic environment particularly with reference to Pakistan and China.
Pakistan’s nuclear policy, yet to be officially articulated, has no restrictions on use of nuclear weapons and thus a first strike. The conditionalities of employment have also under gone a modification from what can be summed up as an existential threat to the Pakistan state to ‘full spectrum deterrence’ implying use of nuclear weapon for warfighting. This was supported by the development of the Nasr – a 60 kms range battlefield rocket.
China on the other hand works on a nuclear equation with the United States and has build up a sizeable arsenal of warheads and a triad of delivery systems.
Correspondingly India’s triad rests on air delivered, land based ballistic missiles and a submarine launched ballistic missile [SLBM] capability. India has developed air and land based weapons systems which a high degree of potency demonstrating credible deterrence.
However, in the context of the NFU policy, an assured second strike capability assumes importance. Towards this end the most credible option is of a nuclear powered SLBM. India has so far inducted two nuclear powered submarines – INS Arihant and INS Arighaat.
While India demonstrated sea patrol of INS Arihant in 2018, this was not considered credible enough by the discerning.
With a second SSBN capable submarine commissioned on August 29, INS Arighaat, will eventually be armed with the 3,500-km range K-4 missile, there is a higher degree of assurance. Two more SSBN are slated for induction in the coming years, once these are armed with the K 4 or a longer version missile, there will be credible deterrent vis a vis China as well as Pakistan.
The Indian Navy is also setting up a Very Low Frequency [VLF] transmitting station at Vikarabad in Telangana which will provide assured degree of communications with the INS Arighaat and ist sucessor the fourth one named INS Aridhaman. Obviously it also implies that the current policy of separation of delivery systems and warheads may also have to undergo a shift.
Interestingly on October 12 Cabinet Committee on Security led by PM Narendra Modi approved the phase III of the Space Based Surveillance (SBS-III) for launching large number of spy satellites in low earth and geostationary orbits. “CCS on Monday gave the approval for launching 52 satellites under the SBS-III project, which would cost around Rs 27,000 crore,” a source in ISRO was quoted by the Times of India.
These satellites are expected to be active 24/7, 365 days in a year and could provide indications by Pakistan [or China] of preparations for a pre-emptive launch of a tactical nuclear weapon or beyond. India will then have other options for negating such a strike – diplomatic, conventional or nuclear within the broader understanding of NFU.
On the massive retaliation front, development of the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle [MIRV] and a maneuverable reentry vehicle [MARV] will greatly reinforce credibility of India’s deterrence both of which are said to be in advanced stages of trials or operationalisation. While there is a talk of an extended range Agni Vi this appears to be some way off.
Supported by an integrated air and missile defence system, the multiple developments being undertaken by India are a sign of the times ahead.
Yet strategic deterrence is a dynamic process and India will have to keep pace with the changes in the environment and work ahead to ensure gaps do not provide a window of opportunity to the adversaries to flaunt their atomic muscle.
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