India’s Challenge Preparing for the Next War: The Binary

The character of warfare has changed we are constantly reminded through ministerial and official statements, media debates and industry conclaves. Technology led by artificial intelligence, quantum electronics, cyber and information are expected to be vectors of success for wars in the future.
The humble soldier, sailor and airman comes last as missiles and drones seem to have taken preference for the large body of “specialists” on defence and security. While, this is not to lament the widening of debate on war in the country, for conflict is too important a business to be left to the military alone. There are many bright minds that can contribute to the debate on wars – a violent engagement with strong element of chance which is difficult to crystal gaze.
At the same time, in war – winning is the only option despite the fact that narrative remains dominant in hyper media environment of today where both sides brazenly declare success where there no ground is to be captured and regime survival is a marker. Thus, selection of the type of war to be fought assumes importance.
Yet the fundamentals of warfighting cannot be ignored which have been elaborated by many doyens over the centuries from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz and our very own Kautilya. Sun Tzu for example highlights five constants of war in which ‘Heaven’ meaning the elements such as seasons, weather and time of the day and night and ‘Earth’ or geography and terrain as is commonly known today are the constants.

Any discussion on the military strategy and operational planning to achieve the objectives of war need to consider these intangibles which are not fungible.
Thus, application of lessons of current wars be it in the Russia - Ukraine or in the more recent U.S./Israel conflicts should take into consideration the two tangibles stated in the Indian context. Another factor is national resilience to accept human and material losses. These assumes importance rather than blindly accepting lessons drawn out of context from foreign wars, by external experts who are alien to Indo Pakistan or India China warfighting conditions.
In short, the belief that in the next war in the Subcontinent missiles and drones combined with air defence will be dominant needs to be tested against the factors stated above.
Firstly, while the aim of a war with Pakistan could be a punitive strike on terrorist hub or select military units and infrastructure, there are no absolutes and thus escalation by the adversary on economic and industrial targets claiming to be dual use cannot be ruled out. In such a scenario, India will remain highly vulnerable to attacks on the vast industrial complexes on the Western and Northern border states ranging from Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab to Uttar Pradesh and Assam. No comparative assets exist either in Pakistan or in Tibet Autonomous Region of China.
Secondly, the densely populated areas on the borders with multiple urban and semi urban conurbation need to be considered. Any escalation that results in civilian casualties is expected to have a major influence on national decision making given the low threshold for human losses. India is not Russia, Ukraine or Iran nor are the skirmishes likely to be existential as it is for some of these states, thus the type of war to be waged needs to ensure that civilian casualties remain low. This cannot be guaranteed in a missile and drone exchange whatever be the pace of creation of the Sudarshan Chakra an impenetrable air defence shield.
Thirdly the national capacity to wage a long war be it economic or military needs consideration, thus a scenario as in Iran or Russia/Ukraine with hundreds and thousands of casualties cannot be envisaged. Moreover, this would be a serious setback to the national objective of Viksit Bharat or a developed India by 2047.
Fourthly the nuclear overhang limits options and while there is a space that has been created as demonstrated during Operation Sindoor, overcoming constraints of the past to respond to a Pakistan sponsored terrorist attack, this context is limited.
This does not imply that India is unable or unwilling to prosecute a war, far from the same India continues to retain substantial conventional capabilities to fight both a contact as well as a non-contact war where national sovereignty, safety and security of the people or values are at stake.
The argument is simply to make the right choice and thus master concepts, organisations, weapons and equipment as well as preparation of leadership for the same. In the binary of contact and/or non-contact preparing for both is inevitable.



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