India continues policy of nuclear restraint with credible minimum deterrence

India's Advanced Agni Missile Test Source Press Information Bureau

One of the most authoritative sources on global trends in nuclear proliferation the SIPRI Report published annually through the SIPRI Yearbook 2026 has been released.

The Report sound some alarm on global nuclear weapons proliferation. ‘Influential voices, including some world leaders, are advocating nuclear weapons as a guarantee against attack by a hostile state. But making national defence and security strategies dependent—or more dependent—on nuclear weapons could significantly increase nuclear risks,’ said SIPRI Director Karim Haggag as per the SIPRI Press Release.

‘The dangers associated with nuclear weapons are growing due to advances in weapon technology, the breakdown of nuclear arms control and heightened geopolitical tensions, among a range of other factors. At the same time, world events—not least the outbreak of conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan—are challenging nuclear deterrence logic,’ Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) says. He is also the co-author of the Chapter on World Nuclear Forces in the SIPRI Yearbook.

These views tend to support the “nuclear domino theory” – new nuclear powers will create a perpetuating escalation amongst rivals seeking parity in capability.

Given US/Israel and Iran war the principal rationale of which is possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as an existential insurance policy, there are genuine concerns that the domino theory will come into play in the Middle East, a source of rivalries only intensified in the ongoing Gulf War 2026.

The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement [SMDA] inked by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025 tends to support this rationale though there is no clarity on whether there is a nuclear component to the same.

Against this backdrop, SIPRI assessment that India has increased nuclear warheads by small numbers estimated to be 190 as of January 2026 should not come as a surprise.

However there is a necessity for a reality check.

India faces two nuclear weapons states – China and Pakistan.

With China there is a perception of a slow burning border confrontation that may lead to an open conflict in the medium to long term due to territorial dispute. The two states also have a No First Use doctrine, though China is said to be veering to a Launch on Warning posture and has preliminaries in place for the purpose in terms of  space based surveillance and detection system. However, in the context of India, this has limited relevance due to India’s NFU and could be principally directed against the US and or Russia or even North Korea.

With Pakistan" unstated First Use nuclear doctrine couched in several innuendos a Full Spectrum Deterrence Plus Plus and so on there is a need for ample caution.

The legacy baggage carried by Islamabad of 1971 and adoption of a ‘bleed by thousands of cuts,’ strategy implies proxy terror operations launched intermittently in India which have the potential of escalation the latest being in May 2025. However, India’s response so far has been mainly conventional.

On the whole, given a dual threat scenario, India could be expected to increase number of warheads substantially years on year and not only in the past one year, but the expansion has been incremental and keeps pace with the  development of delivery systems rather than directed by seeking parity in numbers, threat perception or as a doctrinal impulse.

India’s rationale for low nuclear warhead numbers is sound with the “doctrine” published on Fourth January 2003 articulating the same as read between the lines.

Firstly, credible minimum deterrence requires optimal warheads for assured retaliation. Survivability and delivery systems assume significance. With three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs] now operational there is an assured delivery platform available.

At the same time, this also increases the demand for keeping warheads mated when deployed with the SSBNs.

The Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability tested most recently during flight trials of Advanced Agni missile also adds to the survivability as well as the necessity for a greater number of warheads.

Massive retaliation is also a part of the Indian nuclear doctrine, thus additional warheads fits into the paradigm.

As India espouses No First Use [NFU] adequacy rather than overwhelming superiority to include more than one level of strikes makes small numbers more viable.

Finally maintaining large nuclear arsenal is organization intensive and expensive. There are other arguments being made as avoiding an arms race and promoting the image of a responsible nuclear power but these are secondary.

In the coming years, incremental increase in nuclear warheads by India can be anticipated given the versatile delivery systems planned for deployment, this should not be alarming as it will be well within the two principles of credible minimum deterrence and NFU.