SIPRI Report Highlights the Decline of Multilateral Peacekeeping and Impact on Conflict Management

SOURCE SIPRI PRESS RELEASE 25 MAY 2026

Despite widespread support to Peacekeeping as a tool for management of conflicts, there is a decline in personnel deployed, almost 50 percent in the last decade marks a new SIPRI Report. This does not augur well for conflict management as there are no indications of a reduced requirement per se.

Here is the detailed SIPRI Press Release

As of 31 December 2025, 78 633 international personnel were deployed with peace operations, 49 per cent fewer than in 2016 and the lowest level since at least the year 2000. Although numbers have been in decline throughout the decade, 2025 saw the sharpest year-on-year drop in the period, by 17 per cent.

‘If things continue in this way, we could see a dramatic weakening of multilateral conflict management and the near-complete sidelining of institutions like the United Nations, due to a perfect storm of funding, political and geopolitical factors,’ said Dr Jaïr van der Lijn, Director of the SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme. ‘The result is likely to be more conflicts, and these conflicts are likely to have even graver impacts on civilians as states abandon long-established norms.’

58 multilateral peace operations were active in 34 countries or territories around the world during 2025. This was three operations fewer than in 2024. Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe both hosted 18 missions, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 14, the Americas 5, and Asia and Oceania 3. Nearly three quarters (73 per cent) of personnel were deployed with just five missions, four of them in sub-Saharan Africa.

States unwilling to fund and unable to agree on UN peace operations in 2025

There was a crisis in funding for UN peace operations as major donors failed to pay their commitments on time or in full. In July 2025, UN peacekeeping operations faced a shortfall of US$2 billion—more than 35 per cent of their total $5.6 billion budget for 2024–25—and several were forced to make deep cuts to personnel numbers as a result.

In the UN Security Council, hardline demands and veto threats from permanent members complicated decisions on renewing operation mandates. For example, despite frequent violations of the 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, the United States demanded the termination of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) during mandate renewal talks in August 2025. In a compromise move, the Security Council voted to renew the mission for a final time until December 2026.

The Security Council authorized the deployment of an expanded security force staffed by an ad hoc coalition, the Gang Suppression Force, in Haiti, along with the creation of a UN Support Office to provide logistical and operational support. This came after a US-backed initiative in 2024 to transform the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti (MSS) into a UN-led and UN-funded peacekeeping operation stalled mainly because of opposition from China and Russia in the UN Security Council.

No viable alternatives to UN-led conflict management

While no new UN-led peacekeeping operations have been mandated since 2014, several have been launched by regional organizations. However, developments in 2025 underlined the limitations of regionally led missions.

Like the UN, regional organizations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also struggled with underfunding and with deadlocked decision-making on peace operations—for example in Sudan and Ukraine—due to geopolitical rivalries.

‘Regional organizations lack key capabilities when it comes to successful, integrated peacebuilding, while they are also plagued by funding shortfalls and inability to reach agreement like the UN,’ said Dr Claudia Pfeifer Cruz, Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme. ‘As UN-led conflict management recedes, it is leaving a growing gap that alternative models are unable to fill.’

Despite the difficulties, there is evidence that support for multilateral conflict management in principle remains broad and strong. For example, more than 130 UN member states discussed how to secure the future of UN peacekeeping at the May 2025 Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial. Also, new peace and ceasefire agreements often include plans to deploy a multilateral peace operation, including the October 2025 peace agreement for Gaza. However, in the UN Security Council and in regional bodies, proposals for new or reconfigured operations have often foundered due to political divisions, host-state resistance and issues over financing.

In this context, responses to international crises are increasingly moving outside the established institutional frameworks of multilateral peace operations, instead taking the form of unilateral, bilateral and ad hoc arrangements that are often more militarized and more directly influenced by the self-interest of the states involved.

‘The collapse of multilateral conflict management is not inevitable. There is evidently widespread support for UN peace operations in principle,’ said Claudia Pfeifer Cruz. ‘However, to sustain multilateral conflict management states will need to go beyond expressions of support—they will need to provide predictable funding and create enough political space to enable effective multilateral responses.’

Impact of Less Conflict Management

The SIPRI Fact Sheet outlines that outlook for multilateral conflict management is not good. Less conflict management may lead to more conflict, while reduced adherence to normative frameworks may lead to more severe conflicts.

Amid increasing geopolitical tensions, accelerated reductions in resources, and growing fragmentation and deinstitutionalization, the coordination of conflict management efforts and renewed attention on integrated approaches will become more important than ever.

Despite perceptions that UN peace operations are ineffective, the May 2025 Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial indicated that many UN member states remain strong supporters of these operations.

Moreover, demand for peace operations is not expected to diminish in the future, as ceasefire and peace agreements continue to require their deployment on the ground— for example, the ISF for Gaza.

Amongst the emerging models of multilateral peacekeeping GSF in Haiti is said to provide the most palatable—if not necessarily the most effective—mission model in the current geopolitical environment for the coming years: mandated by the Security Council, staffed by an ad hoc coalition and funded by donors, with modular assistance from a UN Support Office.

Other notable developments

All of the top 10 contributors of military personnel to multilateral peace operations were in the Global South. Uganda became the top contributor of military personnel, followed by Nepal, Bangladesh and India. The remaining top 10 contributors were located in sub-Saharan Africa (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Kenya) or Asia and Oceania (Pakistan and Indonesia).

Personnel deployed increased in the Americas and Europe but decreased in all other regions.

Two new peace operations were established in 2025: the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) in Haiti. Both replaced existing missions.

Four peace operations closed in 2025, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Haiti, in Iraq and in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.