Pakistan had a relatively comfortable 2024 where but for the challenges faced on the terrorism front and relations with Afghanistan, predicaments in other quarters were managed to prevent a crisis. Will 2025 follow a similar trajectory and stabilize the country from its penchant to swing from one disaster to another would depend on management of critical drivers impacting each domain.
On the political front, continued democratic regression can be anticipated given the challenges faced in reconciliation between the main opposition party the Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf [PTI] and the government on one hand and the differences between the PTI and the Army. The Army’s strongarm action against PTI’s core supporters placing the entire blame of the May 09, 2023 riots and its leader former Premier Imran Khan who is presently in jail on multiple charges means that there is unlikely to be a meeting point between the political parties as well. The volatile and highly erratic leadership of Mr Khan who is unwilling to compromise even as the first official meeting between the two sides has commenced in December. This comes even as the former ISI Chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed known to be close to Mr Khan has been convicted by an army field general court martial and is awaiting sentence.
The judiciary which had some top Supreme Court judges seen in favour of Mr Khan has been effectively undermined, thus the chips seem to be down for the PTI leader who is unlikely to go down without a fight and thus a politically turbulent 2025 awaits Pakistan.
But this does not mean that the Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif government is in trouble. An understanding between the Prime Minister and the Army chief General Syed Asim Munir who is not threatened by the end of a three year tenure in November with a constitutional extension of five years implies that the military will not rock the government.
One factor could be Nawaz Sharif Supremo of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz who has had a rocky relationship with the military in the past. If he deems that younger brother Shahbaz has exceeded his brief there could be a change though at present an unlikely scenario.
Multiple political challenges are expected to continue due to lack of commitment to find lasting solutions. For instance, the crisis in Kurram has been mischaracterized by the military as a “tribal land dispute.” This is a multi-dimensional one to include sectarianism and militancy and even plain criminal terror which will have to be addressed for a holistic solution which is unlikely in the near future.
On the counter terrorism front, Pakistan Army is expected to launch a concerted counter terrorism campaign which may include targeted air strikes on the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan [TTP] sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Evacuation of civilians from select areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is likely as the Intelligence Based Operations counter terrorist model has not worked so far. An intense counter insurgency campaign will be pursued through the year and may result in a stalemate give that the Afghan Taliban is not likely to relent.
At the same time until the integration of underdeveloped areas of KP and Balochistan and development to the standards in Punjab and Sindh is achieved, inequalities and sense of discrimination will continue to foster ethno-nationalist sentiment in the respective communities providing enough new recruits to groups as the TTP and the Baloch Liberation Army.
In fact the numbers as flagged by Mr Ali Amin Gandapur, the chief minister of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province being 22,000 and 24,000 members of TTP in Afghanistan and additional 16,000 to 18,000 TTP fighters operating inside Pakistan if true, than there is a multiyear counter insurgency campaign for Pakistan in 2025.
Pakistan’s 25th IMF bailout programme has led to degree of stability even though tax reforms are awaited and the debt burden will remain a drag on the economy despite some favourable numbers in December 2024 including a current account surplus. Structural deficits will denote that there is unlikely to be a substantial relief in the near term despite the euphoria in the Karachi Stock Exchange all through 2024.
On the foreign policy front, Pakistan will continue to face challenges from Afghanistan and India ironically for similar affronts. Pakistan blames Kabul for supporting the TTP while India has provided substantial proof of Pak support to Kashmir and other terrorist groups.
This implies that there will be a no- go situation in the near future. On the other hand, relations with Bangladesh are likely to improve with a new interim administration in power led by a leadership that is questioning even India’s role in the War of Independence of that country in 1971.
China will continue to be an all weather friend of Pakistan despite recent differences on terrorist attacks on Chinese citizens and the continuous bleeding of Chinese workers. Russia may emerge as a new strategic partner with the United States, UK and Europe suffering a setback after recent sanctions on Pakistan’s long range missile programme and comments on sentencing of civilians by military courts. Sanctions on Pakistan key strategic establishment the National Development Complex by the US in December will also impact Pakistan US relations which are likely to remain turbulent. What view the Trump administration takes after Pakistan’s diminished significance post Afghan pullout is unclear for now? Will this push Pakistan towards the China-Russia axis with active wooing by Moscow remains to be seen?
On the military front sustained capacity building is anticipated with Chinese support to include front line fighter aircraft, frigates and submarines sufficient to make the Indian Navy uncomfortable as stated publicly in the run up to the Indian Navy Day on December 04.
All in all will 2025 be a better year for Pakistan remains to be seen, but structural political, economic and militancy drift means that developments will determine whether it is better prepared to face a crisis ahead in the decade or succumb.
Comments