India Defence: India’s Fighter Engine Conundrum Why More is Less?

Representative Image from Wix Media

India’s multi decadal quest for developing a fighter engine has generated multiple responses from global industrial majors specialising in this niche area of technology. Some are looking at assisting the Defence Research Development Organisation [DRDO] which had failed to fully develop the much-vaunted Kaveri engine which may be repurposed as Kaveri Dry Engine (KDE), for Unarmed Aerial Systems [UAS] colloquially known as drones.

Recognising the challenges faced in acquisition of sovereign aero-engine technology given multiple technologies such as high-temperature metallurgy, complex simulation, precision manufacturing, and digital engine control systems, India has now adopted a co-design and development model with multiple global engine majors. The objective appears to be to increase negotiating position leveraging competing offers and derisking chances of failure. Moreover, distribution of workload to the private sector is also believed to be a factor in acquisition of core technologies in precision machining, component casting, and sub-tier assembly.

For medium-thrust fighter requirements, India selected the General Electric F414-GE-INS6 turbofan engine to power the Tejas Mk2, the Twin-Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF), and initial production Mark 1 squadrons of the AMCA. In 2023, GE Aerospace signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the co-production of 98 kN class engines in India. The agreement encompasses an 80% Transfer of Technology (ToT) by value to include precision machining and coating technologies for single-crystal turbine blades, fabrication and processing of advanced ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) laser drilling of angled film-cooling holes in combustor liners and precision nozzle-guide vane manufacturing and bottle boring of central drive shafts. The process is believed to be delayed due to commercial negotiations and restrictions of IP transfer under US laws.

Overcome US technology restrictions, DRDO’s gas turbine developer Gas Turbin Research Establishment or GTRE and Safran Aircraft Engines proposal has been accepted by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The project will develop a new turbofan engine delivering between 110 kN and 130 kN of thrust with an entirely original engine core for the AMCA Mk2 with serial production targeted to commence around 2036.

In August [2026], Reliance Industries and British aerospace major Rolls-Royce announced a partnership to develop and manufacture an engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme. “As part of the partnership, Reliance and Rolls-Royce will explore the formation of a dedicated Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex that will be a centre of excellence for power and propulsion technology in India,” the statement read. The partnership will offer a proposition for joint development of the AMCA 2 engine in India and appears to be derisking against the GTRE Safran joint project.

Now Russia is also pitching in during the bilateral summit between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi being held on September 11 on the eve of the BRICS Summit. As per some media reports, Russia has offered to share technology related to the Su-57’s engine, potentially allowing significant portions of the engine to be manufactured in India in case India procures two to five squadrons of the Fifth-Generation Fighter. India had examined the NPO Lyulka-Saturn AL-41F1 (also called izdeliye 117) turbofan engine which powers the current version and had found lacking in thrust. Russia India joint project for development of fifth-generation fighters failed due to unwillingness of Moscow to share critical technologies including engines.

Yet while the number of proposals for combat engine development are promising, “more maybe less,” as there are concerns over sharing of knowledge and the promise of technology transfer being used as a façade to corner the lucrative Indian fighter engine market having a potential of at least 400 plus in the medium to long term if not more. The proof of the commitment will come a decade hence when the commitment is fully honoured - a complex process requiring not just approval by the respective businesses involved but also governments.

Finally, the cost of achieving engine sovereignty remains unclear—not only in financial terms, but also because combat aircraft will be fielded decades later than needed.