Global Space Security Governance: Defining Trends Outlined in SIPRI YB 2026

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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2026 chapter, "Space Security Governance," provides a comprehensive assessment of the rapidly evolving security dynamics in outer space during 2025.

Written by Nivedita Raju, the chapter examines how increasing geopolitical competition, technological advancement, and declining multilateral cooperation have transformed space from a primarily civilian and scientific domain into a contested strategic environment. Rather than merely documenting policy developments, the report critically analyses how national ambitions and strategic rivalries are reshaping the governance of outer space. It demonstrates that space security has become an integral component of international security, with implications extending to nuclear deterrence, military operations, diplomacy, and international law.

One of the report's strongest contributions is its ability to connect technological developments with broader geopolitical trends. It argues that the pursuit of sovereign space capabilities accelerated significantly during 2025, particularly in the United States, China, and Europe.

The report explains that growing uncertainty in transatlantic relations, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, and intensifying strategic competition have encouraged states to reduce dependence on foreign space infrastructure while investing in independent military and commercial capabilities. Rather than treating technological progress as inevitable, SIPRI situates these developments within the context of changing international politics.

A major focus of the report is the United States' Golden Dome initiative, arguably the most consequential space security development of 2025. SIPRI explains that the proposal marks a significant shift in US missile defense policy by seeking to establish a multilayered defence system that includes space-based interceptors. The report carefully analyses both the technological and strategic implications of this proposal. It notes that although the initiative aims to strengthen homeland defense, it faces considerable technical challenges and enormous financial costs. More importantly, SIPRI argues that placing interceptors in orbit would fundamentally alter existing norms governing outer space and could encourage other major powers to pursue similar capabilities. The report therefore convincingly portrays Golden Dome not simply as a missile defense project but as a development capable of accelerating the weaponization of space and undermining strategic stability.

Closely related to this discussion is the report's examination of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPOs). SIPRI provides a balanced explanation of these increasingly common space activities, noting that they possess both civilian and military applications. While RPOs enable valuable missions such as satellite servicing, docking, and debris removal, the same technologies can potentially be employed for offensive purposes, including anti-satellite operations. The report effectively highlights how the absence of internationally accepted definitions, notification mechanisms, and operational guidelines creates opportunities for misunderstanding and political escalation. The example of US officials describing Chinese satellite manoeuvres as "dogfighting" demonstrate how ambiguous terminology can amplify suspicion even when no hostile action has occurred. SIPRI's emphasis on developing shared terminology and "rules of the road" represents one of the report's most practical recommendations.

Another notable strength is the report's comparative analysis of national space strategies. Rather than examining countries individually, SIPRI identifies broader trends shaping space governance across major powers. China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union are all shown to be strengthening sovereign space capabilities while increasingly viewing space as an essential element of national security. Although each actor adopts different policy approaches, they collectively demonstrate a shift from dependence on international cooperation toward greater strategic autonomy.

The discussion of European space policy is particularly insightful. SIPRI explains that European governments increasingly seek independent access to space, partly because of uncertainty surrounding long-term US commitments. The proposed EU Space Act illustrates this strategic shift by aiming to create a unified regulatory framework while promoting resilience, sustainability, and technological competitiveness. The report also highlights tensions between the European Union and the United States, especially regarding regulatory requirements affecting American commercial space companies such as SpaceX. This analysis effectively demonstrates that competition in space governance increasingly extends beyond military capabilities to include industrial policy, commercial regulation, and technological leadership.

The report also provides valuable insight into China's evolving approach to space governance. Rather than portraying China solely as a strategic competitor, SIPRI presents a nuanced analysis that recognizes China's growing support for multilateral governance while simultaneously expanding its national and commercial space capabilities.

Similarly, SIPRI analyses the changing United States space doctrine, highlighting both continuity and contradiction. On one hand, documents such as the US Space Force's Space Warfighting Framework openly prepare military forces for operations in space and emphasize achieving space superiority. On the other hand, broader US national security documents appear to reduce emphasis on allied cooperation while increasingly prioritizing American technological dominance. SIPRI successfully argues that these mixed signals contribute to uncertainty among allies and competitors alike, complicating efforts to establish stable international norms.

One of the report's greatest strengths lies in its analysis of multilateral governance. SIPRI demonstrates that despite growing recognition of space security challenges, progress within the United Nations remains slow. The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space struggled to move beyond procedural disputes during much of 2025. Deep divisions between major powers regarding legally binding treaties, voluntary norms, verification mechanisms, and definitions of space weapons continue to obstruct meaningful negotiations. The report realistically acknowledges that geopolitical tensions increasingly spill into multilateral institutions, making consensus progressively more difficult.

SIPRI report argues that bilateral, regional, and "minilateral" dialogues may offer practical opportunities for confidence-building while broader multilateral negotiations remain stalled. In particular, it identifies middle powers such as Brazil, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Egypt, and the Philippines as potentially important contributors to future governance initiatives. This recommendation reflects an appreciation that progress in international governance does not necessarily depend exclusively on major powers.

Limitations

First, much of the analysis focuses on official government policies and diplomatic developments rather than operational realities. Although policy documents reveal strategic intentions, greater discussion of actual military space operations or commercial activities could have provided a more comprehensive understanding of current security dynamics.

Second, the report devotes relatively limited attention to the rapidly expanding role of private space companies. Commercial actors increasingly provide launch services, satellite communications, remote sensing, and space infrastructure that directly influence national security. While SpaceX and Starlink receive some discussion, a deeper examination of how commercial companies are reshaping space governance would have strengthened the analysis.

Third, the chapter's structure, moving from capability developments to national policies to multilateral forums, occasionally produces information in one section that bears directly on another without being cross-referenced. The NATO discussion, for instance, sits at the end of section III but is directly relevant to the earlier assessment of transatlantic strain over Golden Dome and the EU Space Act; a brief signpost linking the two would have tied the chapter's argument together more tightly.

Conclusion

Overall, Space Security Governance is an authoritative and timely assessment of one of the most rapidly evolving dimensions of international security. SIPRI successfully demonstrates that space is no longer merely a domain of scientific cooperation but an increasingly contested strategic environment characterized by military modernization, technological competition, and weakening multilateralism. By combining analysis of national policies, technological developments, and international governance efforts, the report provides readers with a comprehensive understanding of contemporary space security challenges. Despite persistent disagreements among major powers, It concludes that sustained dialogue, greater transparency, confidence-building measures, and inclusive international cooperation remain essential for preventing miscalculation and preserving the long-term security and sustainability of outer space. As global dependence on space-based technologies continues to grow, the report serves as an invaluable resource for policymakers, researchers, and students seeking to understand the future of international space governance.

Stuti Sharma is a Research Intern with Security Risks Asia