Bangladesh Forecast December 2025: Onward to Polls with Contestations

Bangladesh Sangshad

There is an opportunity for fundamental change in Bangladesh, however continued political squabbling pouring on to the streets and elitocracy may deprive the man on the street true change going to the elections in February next year.

United States Expansion of Interest and Influence. United States is expected to attempt to increase influence in the Bay of Bengal with focus on Bangladesh with an attempt to wean it away from China. This is evident from the recent statement by Brent Christensen, nominee for US ambassador to Bangladesh. Sustained support for a free and fair polls in Bangladesh remains from the United States, European Union and other international stakeholders who will be deploying several poll observers to the country. 

Regional Relations. The anti-India sentiment that is evident in some quarters of the Interim administration has come to the fore over a period with Dhaka blaming Indian media for the fake news. Meanwhile there is cautious optimism of a change in the tone and tenor once an elected government comes to power though concerns continue. However, the proximity of the Awami League led government for the past 15 years is unlikely to be replicated. India is likely to be concerned over the Jamaat-e-Islami [JEI] coming to power in Bangladesh, JeI leaders publicly express a desire for “harmonious” ties with India, they also criticize New Delhi’s past “interference” in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. India is likely to adopt a cautious, security-first approach especially due to Jamaat close relations with Pakistan and Turkey is another factor that may impact relations with India.  The Bangladesh and Pakistan cooperation in multiple spheres including defence is also likely to lead to tensions with India. 

Political Developments.  Although Bangladesh experienced a major leadership change in 2025, political patterns remain largely unchanged—elite control persists, consensus is weak, and institutions remain unstable. Factionalism, weak parties, and legitimacy issues persist. Suppressed groups are more active, but reforms are stalled amid economic challenges. Distrust makes the Consensus Commission's impact unclear, and divisions threaten continued gridlock. Overall, meaningful transformation is unlikely without substantial reforms and more inclusive governance. Politicisation of the judiciary is another facet evident from the role during Hasina’s rule and the clean chit given to BNP Vice Chairman on charges of having ordered attacks on the Awami League which have been very diligently proved in the court of law. The coming months will test whether change is substantive or symbolic.

 In the short term, although timing of the referendum is yet to be decided, it is almost certain that there will be one on the July National Charter in one form or the other. In its outline submitted to the interim government, the National Consensus Commission has proposed two alternative formulations for the referendum question. At the same time, July Charter may be too complex for many citizens to fully grasp during a referendum, posing risks to informed democratic participation.

Differences in political parties over the timing of the referendum with BNP bloc insisting on the same being in tandem with the polls in February, Proportional Representation are some of the differences that is likely to see some contestations ahead. Party nominations are also likely to remain a challenge leading to factional clashes.

Thus, security will be one of the major concerns during the polls. While the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the National Citizens Party and the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami are the main contenders, their coalitions with other parties will also dictate the poll outcomes. 

Mainstream parties like BNP oppose proportional representation (PR) in Bangladesh due to fears of weakened voter-representative ties, while Jamaat-e-Islami supports PR to gain parliamentary inclusion and counter electoral marginalization.

Defence and Security With a dynamic shift in engagement with Pakistan how far forward this goes remains to be seen, with Turkey waiting in the wings.  Charges of blatant violation of norms by the International Crimes Tribunal on a section of the officers deputed to the Rapid Action Battalion [RAB] and Director General Forces Intelligence [DGFI] exposes the politization of a section of the military. How this will impact the rank and file is unclear for now.

A decrease in UN Peacekeeping numbers is also anticipated due to funding concerns. The

Army leadership will have to manage the elections security as 42,761 voting centres will be operational with 2,44,739 voting booths across the centres.

Nearly two-thirds of polling centres for the upcoming national election have been classified as "risky," a sharp rise from the 2024 polls, when only about 25 percent of centres were deemed risky

Transition post polls will remain on the radar as well.

Economy. The World Bank Report October 2025 has clearly outlined the political transition risks to Bangladesh economy.  Investor sentiment has been affected, leading to delays in foreign direct investment as well as private sector expansion—developments that are likely to improve only after a new government assumes office and demonstrates relative stability. Persistent legacy inflation from the previous administration is expected to surpass 10% in 2025, placing pressure on household finances and dampening consumer demand.

With the Awami League no longer in a central position, several factions are competing for influence, which adds complexity to consensus-building around economic reforms.

These challenges are further compounded by Bangladesh’s anticipated graduation from the Least Developed Country category in 2026, a change that risks the loss of duty-free market access and higher compliance costs, thus necessitating strategic planning in an evolving political environment. Despite these uncertainties, there remains optimism for policy continuity, as the Interim government has refrained from significant structural adjustments—though this could itself present additional risks.