Simulation of Likely Chinese Response to India Philippines Strategic Partnership
- Security Risks Research
- 46 minutes ago
- 5 min read

As India and the Philippines with contested relations with China involving boundary – land and maritime have inked a strategic partnership, simulation of the Chinese reaction could prove of interest.
Declaration of Strategic Partnership
At the invitation of the Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, the President of Philippines, Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. is on a State Visit to India from 4-8 August 2025. One of the highlights of the visit was the “Declaration on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on August 05, 2025.
A substantial portion of the Joint Declaration was on defence, security and maritime cooperation details of which are as given below-
(b) DEFENCE, SECURITY AND MARITIME COOPERATION
• Acknowledging the progress made under the Agreement on Defence Cooperation signed between India and the Philippines on 4 February 2006;
• Facilitating the regular convening of institutional mechanisms including the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) and Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committee (JDILC) for dialogue on defence cooperation, with emphasis on defence industrial collaboration, defence technology, research, training, exchanges, and capacity building;
• Institutionalising military training activities between the two countries and Service-to-Service interactions, with increased focus on tri-service cooperation;
• Recognizing the vital role of the seas and oceans in achieving development needs of the two countries, rights and freedoms as coastal states, developing economies, and maritime nations of the Indo-Pacific region;
• Institutionalizing engagements on maritime issues and commending the deepening maritime cooperation between India and the Philippines, including by the annual India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue which was first held in Manila on 11-13 December 2024, and looking forward to India’s hosting of the next dialogue as a way to maintain the positive momentum of maritime engagement;
• Exchanging views on global and regional maritime challenges, sharing best practices on deepening maritime cooperation, and promoting coordination and expertise between maritime authorities and law enforcement agencies and marine science and research institutions on the peaceful, sustainable and equitable use of the oceans, seas, and marine resources;
• Sharing of best practices, intelligence, technical support, subject matter expert (SME) exchanges, workshops and industrial assistance through and between appropriate agencies of both Governments;
• Enhancing cooperation in the area of maritime security including through collaborative efforts for enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA), cooperation in ship-building, maritime connectivity, coastal surveillance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), pollution control and search and rescue (SAR) between Navies and Coast Guards;
• Collaborating and cooperating in co-development and co-production of defence equipment, to achieve the goal of self-reliance in defence production, and encouraging investments and joint initiatives in the establishment of defence R&D, and supply chain ecosystem;
• Expanding cooperation in the field of hydrography, including improvement of hydrographic infrastructure and joint oceanographic research surveys to ensure safe and efficient navigation contributing to the overall maritime security of the region;
• Striving for participation in multilateral exercises including in the ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise and Exercise MILAN, and the Philippines’ Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs);
• Fostering greater security cooperation through regular dialogues, engagements and exchanges of best practice on UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), supply chain management, military medicine, global and regional security environment, traditional and non-traditional security concerns such as maritime security, and cyber security and critical technology issues, as well as the protection of critical information infrastructure, and security-related concerns on economic matters;
• Strengthening joint efforts, including through regular convening of the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism, in (i) combating terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization, transnational organised crimes including trafficking in narcotics and weapons, human trafficking, cyber-crimes, cyber-threats from new and emerging technologies, misuse of the internet for terrorism purposes, terror financing, international economic crimes, proliferation financing, money laundering; (ii) facilitating the sharing of information and best practices, capacity building, co-operation in multilateral fora on counter-terrorism; and (iii) promoting zero tolerance towards terrorism;
• Deepening cooperation in cyber domain, including through policy dialogue, capacity building, sharing of best practices and exchanges of expertise on digital public infrastructure, financial technology, digital economy, artificial intelligence, digital forensics and Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) cooperation, protection of critical information infrastructure and capacity building on digital skills;
Amongst the List of Outcomes apart from the Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Republic of the Philippines and India-Philippines Strategic Partnership: Plan of Action (2025-29). Terms of References were also established for Staff Talks between three services of the two countries, the Army, Navy and the Air Force.
Another related development was the Operational Deployment and exercises of Indian Naval Ships INS Delhi (Guided Missile Destroyer), INS Shakti (Fleet Tanker), and INS Kiltan (Anti Submarine Warfare corvette) of the Eastern Fleet, under the Command of Rear Admiral Susheel Menon, Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet (FOCEF), to Manila, Philippines. The ships engaged in bilateral maritime exercise with the Philippine Navy ships on 03 - 04 Aug 25.
Given prevailing tensions between China and Philippines in the South China Sea as well as India China deployment on the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh for the past five years, China would be observing these developments very closely. Simulation of Chinese reactions would therefore be fruitful.
Simulation
For China the key constant vis a vis Philippines in particular is the favourable strategic balance it enjoys in the South China Sea, which will be clearly impacted with more stakeholders as India assistManila in balancing.
Thus the response is expected to be based on this key variable and on the lines as given below.
On the diplomatic front Chinese response would be to sound a warning of sorts to third parties from intervening in the disputes of South China Sea and that bilateral cooperation should not be targeted at any country. The scale of aggressive ness in the rhetoric and tone would determine the level of seriousness with which China views the activity. In case China calls up diplomatic representatives of the two new strategic partners India and Philippines and issues a demarche it would be evident that Beijing is certainly disturbed by the developments and sees the same against the strategic interests.
Importantly on the military front the Chinese increase patrolling by the Coast Guard, the fishing fleet or even the PLA Navy to intimidate Philippines can be anticipated. On the Indian side, de-escalation from the LAC remains in a limbo and there were some hopes of the same happening before the onset of winter which could be delayed.
China’s economic card at present facilitates it to play a strong hand which would imply possible delays in normalization of relations with India as New Delhi is now grappling with the new challenge thrown by President Trump.
On the flip side if the Chinese assessment is to wait and watch the progression of the strategic partnership apart from some statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there could be only a tepid response.