Pakistan’s Multiple Terror Antagonists, Defy the Narrative of Indian Role

Source - Courtesy TRAC Terrorism

In the past few months after the Pahalgam terrorist attack carried out by the Pakistan supported Lashkar e Taiyyaba acolyte The Resistance Front which killed 26 innocent Indian and one Nepali citizen, the information arm of the Pakistan Army DG ISPR has laid emphasis on labeling all terrorist groups as supported by India.

This however belies the factual structure of terrorist groups in Pakistan. As a "TRAC Incident Report: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Affiliate Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) Conducts Suicide Attack Targeting Army Convoy in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan", reveals there are multiple factions which are challenging the Pakistani state in the tribal belt. These have no connection with India which the Afghan Taliban has also emphasised.

TRAC Incident Report -  Details

Detailing the incident of 28 June 2025, TRAC Incident Report states - a Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) militant conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack targeting a Pakistani military convoy in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. The blast killed 13 soldiers and injured over 20 others, including at least 14 civilians. In addition to striking military vehicles, the explosion damaged nearby residential buildings, underscoring the collateral human cost often associated with such high-yield attacks in densely inhabited areas.

This incident marks HGB’s first confirmed use of a suicide bomber since March 2025, suggesting a calculated return to one of the group’s most lethal and symbolically potent tactics. Although the operation was not part of a synchronised multi-pronged assault, the choice of method, timing, and location strongly implies strategic signalling. Far from being an isolated incident, the bombing serves as a message to both Pakistani authorities and rival jihadist factions of HGB’s continued relevance and operational capability.

Mir Ali, located in a persistently volatile region near the Afghan border, is a strategic hub for various jihadist entities due to its rugged terrain, tribal affiliations, and access to transnational networks. The town has historically served as a logistical and recruitment base for both al-Qaeda-linked and Taliban-aligned factions. The attack occurred just one day before the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) coalition, of which HGB is a core member along with Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Harkat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), issued statements claiming responsibility for 26 coordinated attacks across North Waziristan. This temporal proximity suggests a deliberate escalation by the coalition, with the SVBIED attack serving as a dramatic kickoff or morale booster for subsequent operations.

This is not the first time HGB has displayed complex attack capabilities. In March 2025, its Jaish-e-Fursan Muhammad (JFM) wing carried out a coordinated raid in Bannu involving 16 militants, including four suicide bombers. That attack demonstrated the group’s capacity for operational synchronisation, recruitment of suicide operatives, and likely access to cross-border logistical support. While the 28 June bombing was less complex in scale, it fits into HGB’s broader strategy of high-impact operations designed to signal resilience, sow fear, and maintain relevance amid shifting dynamics in the tribal belt.

The attack also sheds light on the evolving factional rivalries within Pakistan’s militant landscape. Although both HGB and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged from the same ideological umbrella, they now function as de facto rivals. Following the March Bannu attack, TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud openly condemned HGB, accusing the group of causing civilian deaths, including children, in a mosque. This public rebuke underscores a competition not just for territorial control but also for public legitimacy and narrative supremacy, especially in contested recruitment zones like Waziristan.

Conclusion

The state of Pashtun insurgency in the tribal belt in Pakistan has a dynamic beyond support by India as alleged by the DGISPR. To counter terrorism comprehensively Pak Establishment needs to recognize the subtleties rather the weaving this as a part of the propaganda campaign against India.

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