Myanmar: Jaideep Saikia’s Five Key Policy Recommendations for India

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Noted Conflict Theorist and Author, Jaideep Saikia has excellent policy recommendations for India’s Myanmar Policy Makers given current turbulence in that country and significance of stability in India’s North East.

Operative Summary

Jaideep Saikia in his conclusion says, an undemanding, farsighted policy would be not to put all the eggs in one basket. Such a line of approach could well render itself to (if the mandarins are listening) (a) continue to do active business with the Generals in Naypyidaw (b) keep an ear close to the ground and listen carefully to the change in breeze and fate that will characterise the conflict in the “Land of Jade” in the near future (c) open covert “diplomatic” feelers with the National Unity Government in Chiang Mai, the structuring of which traditional Indian agencies charged with such business are perfectly capable of, and (d) renew old (soured) relationships with ethnic militias such Kachin Independent Army, Chin National Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Karen National Liberation Army, Arakan Army and explore novel pathways for forward depth engineering with such formations and (d) most importantly utilise the recent and new found “bonhomie” with Beijing so that at least India’s interest is not hurt in Myanmar. In simple terms, the realistic strategy that India must adopt, for now, should be to keep all the options open in engagement with diverse and contesting actors in Myanmar’s internal Space.

Read the Full Article by the Author Below

Keeping Indian Options Open in Myanmar

The past few months have witnessed the civil war in Myanmar taking unpredictable twist and turns. The People’s Defence Force which is the armed wing of the Chiang Mai-based National Unity Government and affiliated ethnic militias of the country seem to have confronted the Myanmar army on quite a few fronts. The setbacks have seen the fleeing of several Myanmar army personnel into Mizoram. The accelerated efforts of the rebel groups have been relentlessly targeting “the military and its assets” and capturing townships that the Myanmar army had been acting as tactical bases. A hitherto disunited resistance has come together to battle the Tatmadaw under a single command and control.

However, the last word in the war has not yet been scripted. After all, temporary defeats have never proclaimed the final outcome. One has to just read how Operation Barbarossa unfurled during World War II, progressed and concluded. Clarity, therefore, continues to defy the direction in which the war in Myanmar is heading towards. This is so despite the rebel groups presently having an upper hand in the conflict. The country’s future would only witness conclusive proclamation in the ensuing months. But the important question that this article wishes to pose is the stand that India should take towards its crucial neighbour even as it watches the unfolding situation in Myanmar.

Realpolitik is realpolitik and, therefore, Myanmar—regardless of who governs its polity——is an important linchpin for India’s “Act East Policy”. My visit to Yangon in 2014 as an Indian representative for “Track II Dialogue,” and later to the Indo-Myanmar borderlands in 2022 after the military takeover of 1 February 2021 informed that the vital entry points from places such as Moreh in Manipur that would have opened the gates to the seamless causeway all the way to the Pacific are refusing to “Go East”. The farsighted dream of the Narendra Modi (who coined the phrase Ashta Laxmi for the eight states that comprise the North East) to open up the North East to trade and commerce that would decisively alter its kismet has come to a standstill.

Myanmar is also the last sanctuary for the Indian insurgent groups. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN (K)) (and its various factions), United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent) (ULFA (I)), a plethora of Meitei groups and even NSCN (Isaac-Muivah) (IM) have well-entrenched camps in the Sagaing Division. There was great optimism when the Myanmar army conducted Op Sunrise-I and Sunrise-II in 2019.

Although certain observers have termed the operations as cosmetic, the fact of the matter is that several insurgent camps in an around Taga (which is a place west of the Chindwin River in Myanmar) were demolished. But such a pro-India stance evaporated after the military takeover in Myanmar.

Indeed, several Indian Insurgent Groups have come to an understanding with the Myanmar army. It is reported that the insurgent would be allowed undisturbed existence in their established camps and in return for which they would have to aid the Myanmar army to quell the rebellion. Such an agreement is fraught with grave national security implications for India.

The state of affairs in Manipur has not shown signs of tangible improvement and it is now known that Valley Based Insurgent Groups or the Group of Five (G-5) billeted in three neat clusters (North, Central and South) in Sagaing have entered the “Land of the Emeralds” with NSCN (IM) aid (via the Somra Tracts) to direct the ethnic pogroms that are being committed by vigilante right-wing groups such as the Arombai Tengol and Meetei Lipun as also carry out attacks on the security forces. The relative lull of the moment must not make the Indian state complacent. It is being surmised that the disturbance that has been created in Manipur will not be allowed to be frittered away by anti-India forces. Manipur is an ethnic maze. If one insurgent group comes overground, there would be ten others to take its place. The United National Liberation Front (Pambei) came back to the mainstream, but the groups Koirang faction is still on war mode in the Central Cluster of Sagaing Division. Weapons are in plenty and reverse doctrination will happen only if the entire Manipur population, of all ethnic denominations, want them to. The present situation has not witnessed this.

ULFA (I), despite the hammering that they have been subjected to by the Indian army may attempt to foment trouble to avenge recent humiliations that they have been faced with. The last drone strike(s) on the ULFA and the NSCN (KYA) camps in Sagaing Division on 13 July 2025 was an able attempt to weaken the two insurgent organisations. But apart from killing a few important leaders of the ULFA such as SS Lt Gen. Nayan Medhi, not much was achieved. Indeed, if press circulations by the ULFA are anything to go by then it has only been emboldened. 

What is, therefore, needed is a blueprint for coordinated joint operations against the insurgents. However, it must be understood that, unlike Bhutan where the Royal Bhutan Army action resulted in ULFA-National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Kamatapur Liberation Organisation cadres fleeing to India (where they were netted by the Indian security forces), the Indian Insurgent Groups will only go deeper into Myanmarese territory, to the safe sanctuaries in the Sino-Myanmarese border, or into areas dominated by the Kachins and the Was who have affinity with such groups.

The above poses a dilemma for the Indian state. On one hand, there are crucial socio-economic and national security implications as aforesaid and ones which are inextricably intertwined with Myanmar, and on the other hand, there is a civil strife that is waxing and waning like irregular lunar cycles. It is, therefore, high time for India to make considered military-diplomatic decisions. What must be New Delhi’s policy towards a state of affairs that has yet to unfold clearly? As aforesaid, notwithstanding the “victories” of the rebel groups, prudence and high-level reading of the entrails India must be guarded about correct policy formulation.

New Delhi has already reached out to Naypyidaw. A Union Defence Secretary-level delegation comprising senior military officials made a two-day trip to Myanmar a couple of years ago in what was described as an “ice-breaking” exercise. Maintenance of peace in the Indo-Myanmar border areas, illegal trans-border movements, and transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and smuggling were also discussed with the Myanmarese military leadership. Of course, it is also known that India tacitly supported the military in “opposition” to the rebel forces loyal to the incarcerated Aung San Suu Kyi in world fora. However, in light of the changing fortunes a la the battle gains of the Peoples’ Defence Force and the other anti-Junta alignment, it would be pragmatic for New Delhi to keep its options open and warm. Hard-nosed farsightedness dictates that New Delhi must enter into retrospection of its strategic objectives. A non-comprehension of such imperatives would sound the death knell to its national security objectives which (as far as Myanmar is concerned) precariously hinges on its “Act East” Policy and Indian insurgent groups that have not only taken shelter in Myanmar but are hitting out at Indian security forces with impunity. The cold-blooded assassination of Col Viplav Tripathi along with his entire family in Manipur’s Churachandpur comes to mind when the sinister designs of the belligerence are brought to mind. The events in Myanmar presage uncertainty for India. But notwithstanding the developments that surround Myanmar’s future, India should anvil a strategy that is not only in line with its “Neighbourhood First” policy of which the “Act East” is a subset of, but also, as aforesaid, the issue relating to the Indian insurgent groups. To that end, a recalibration exercise that takes into consideration a matrix that balances out well between ideology and pragmatism is the imperative of the hour.

Conclusion

To conclude, an undemanding, farsighted policy would be not to put all the eggs in one basket. Such a line of approach could well render itself to (if the mandarins are listening) (a) continue to do active business with the Generals in Naypyidaw (b) keep an ear close to the ground and listen carefully to the change in breeze and fate that will characterise the conflict in the “Land of Jade” in the near future (c) open covert “diplomatic” feelers with the National Unity Government in Chiang Mai, the structuring of which traditional Indian agencies charged with such business are perfectly capable of, and (d) renew old (soured) relationships with ethnic militias such Kachin Independent Army, Chin National Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Karen National Liberation Army, Arakan Army and explore novel pathways for forward depth engineering with such formations and (d) most importantly utilise the recent and new found “bonhomie” with Beijing so that at least India’s interest is not hurt in Myanmar. In simple terms, the realistic strategy that India must adopt, for now, should be to keep all the options open.