Agnipath Scheme: A Reform Requiring Careful Assessment

The Agnipath scheme was introduced in 2022 with the objective of creating a younger, fitter and more technologically adaptable Armed Forces while reducing the long-term manpower and pension burden. Under the scheme, Agniveers serve for four years, with up to 25 per cent of each batch being retained in the regular cadre. The remaining personnel leave with a financial package and are expected to transition to civilian employment, including opportunities in the Central Armed Police Forces, State Police, Home Guard and other government and private-sector organisations.

Whether the scheme will ultimately prove a success or failure, however, is too early to determine. The first batch of Agniveers has now completed its four-year engagement, and its actual impact on combat effectiveness, unit cohesiveness, discipline, morale and manpower management will become clearer over the coming years.

Feedback from the field presents a mixed picture. Some Commanding Officers (Cos) have expressed the view that the scheme could become considerably more effective if the retention rate were increased from 25 per cent to around 50–60 per cent. Higher retention would preserve more trained and experienced personnel within the Army and strengthen unit cohesiveness and combat effectiveness. A four-year tenure may otherwise result in the Services losing personnel just when they begin acquiring valuable operational experience and proficiency in their trades.

There are also field-level concerns regarding the quality and motivation of some batches, willingness to undertake demanding operational duties and the effect of uncertainty over permanent absorption on discipline and morale. Such observations, however, should be treated as field-level feedback rather than generalised to all Agniveers. The scheme should be assessed through objective data covering training standards, operational performance, disciplinary record, physical fitness, morale, retention, unit cohesiveness and combat effectiveness.

Another important issue is whether the training period and training content are adequate for the roles and weapons that Agniveers are expected to handle. Modern warfare increasingly requires soldiers to operate sophisticated communications, drones, surveillance systems, precision weapons, other technology-intensive equipment and cyber warfare. The emphasis must therefore be on ensuring that shorter service does not result in inadequate training or insufficient time to develop operational competence.

The fundamental question is also whether a fighting unit should contain two categories of soldiers—those pursuing a long-term military career and those serving for only four years with a limited prospect of retention. The distinction can affect career expectations, motivation and regimental bonding. The traditional strength of the Indian Armed Forces has rested not merely on youth and physical fitness but also on experience, discipline, unit cohesiveness, leadership and the regimental ethos. Any manpower reform must preserve these attributes.

An associated issue that merits serious consideration is the assimilation of Agniveers not retained in the Armed Forces into other uniformed security organisations, including the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), Coast Guard and Assam Rifles. Some senior officers in the CPOs have reportedly expressed reservations about the automatic assimilation of the Agniveers who are not retained in the Armed Forces, raising the question whether personnel not selected for permanent military service should necessarily be inducted into the CPOs/ CAPFs. At the same time, the Government has sought to make such post-service employment avenues an important component of the Agnipath scheme. This raises a legitimate policy question: if Agniveers are considered adequately trained, disciplined and fit to serve in the Armed Forces for four years, how should their suitability for employment in other uniformed security organisations be assessed after they leave? The real test of the Agnipath scheme is therefore not merely whether the 25 per cent retained in the Armed Forces perform well, but also whether the remaining Agniveers can be productively utilised after four years rather than becoming a pool of trained but unemployed young men vulnerable to criminal activities. The recent decision to increase reservation for ex-Agniveers in the CPOs/CAPFs, Coast Guard and Assam Rifles from the earlier 10 per cent to 50 per cent is a significant step towards creating such job opportunities.

There is also a wider strategic dimension that deserves careful consideration: the impact of the Agnipath scheme on the recruitment of Gorkhas from Nepal. The Gorkhas have a long and distinguished history of service in the Indian Army and have traditionally been valued for their courage, discipline, loyalty and battlefield effectiveness. Due to poverty and unemployment in Nepal, this valuable human resource is vulnerable to enrolment by our adversaries, thus potentially jeopardising India's national interest, bilateral friendly relations with a neighbouring country and national security. The implications of any substantial change in Gorkha recruitment therefore extend beyond manpower management and deserve consideration from the perspective of India's wider strategic and diplomatic interests and good neighbourly relations with Nepal.

The Agnipath scheme should therefore be regarded as a major manpower reform requiring continuous evaluation and mid-course correction rather than being prematurely labelled either a success or a failure. Increasing retention, wherever operationally justified, reviewing training and service conditions, strengthening post-service employment avenues and ensuring that Agniveers serving alongside regular soldiers remain equally motivated and operationally effective are important areas for consideration. Recommendations emerging from the three Services, together with evidence from the field, should receive serious attention before further refinements are made.

Two senior retired Generals from my Regiment [The Kumaon] with extensive experience of the Army, have also expressed reservations about the scheme. One pointed out that, while Agnipath may reduce the long-term pension burden and create a younger, more technologically oriented force, the recruitment-to-retirement imbalance could progressively aggravate existing manpower deficiencies. He also questioned whether a short-service system would provide the diverse experience and skills required by a modern military. The other cautioned that shorter tenures could adversely affect leader-led relationships, unit cohesiveness, camaraderie and the willingness to accept operational risks, particularly when a soldier knows that his future employment remains uncertain after four years. Both stressed that the real challenge would be the effective training and operational employment of Agniveers within the limited tenure and the credible absorption of the majority released from service.

Ultimately, the first batch of Agniveers has now completed its four-year tenure. The real test of the scheme will begin with what happens next: the operational contribution of those absorbed into the regular Armed Forces; the successful transition of the remaining Agniveers into the Central Armed Police Forces, State Police, Home Guards, Coast Guard, Assam Rifles and other employment avenues; the career trajectory of those who do not secure such opportunities; and the future of personnel who leave service on medical or disciplinary grounds. The performance, conduct, employment and career progression of these cohorts, together with the recommendations and experience of the three Services and the considered views of senior military leaders who were involved when the scheme was formulated, will provide the most credible evidence of the true efficacy, sustainability and long-term value of the Agnipath scheme.