Aug 22, 2011

Army – Preventive Deployment

The Army has assessed as per reports in the Indian Express requirement of 60-65,000 troops for counter Naxal operations. This will involve deployment of six Army divisions to cover Naxal-affected areas in West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Orissa, parts of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The recent intelligence reports that Pakistan was planning to provide support to the Naxals, meeting of the CCOMPOSA in March and increase in the Naxal kitty of funds has led to a review of assessment by the government as well as the Army.

Defence minister A.K. Antony stated, “We are there not to fight or engage Naxalite. At the same time, the government has given them (the army) standard operating procedures for self-defence.” The army has been allotted 750sqkm for a “manoeuvre range” in Narayanpur on the edges of the Maoist stronghold in “Abujhmarh”, near the Raoghat mines of the Bhilai steel plant in which two battalions from the Assam and Bihar regiments of the infantry have been deployed. The Army is also claiming that activation of a firing range is necessary as there are only 40 firing ranges available now, down from 104 six years ago.

Meanwhile Rules of Engagement have been spelt out for the Army to include fire in self-defence if attacked by Maoists; train in the area allocated without using live fire; fortify camp(s) without damage to the environment; sanitise access roads and approaches with the help of the police and restrict interaction with civilians to a bare minimum.

The Army’s overall assessment seems to have been done in anticipation of a possible deployment for counter Naxal operations which is natural for any military to envisage in a forthcoming scenario and prepare for the same. Thus the appreciation is based on level of threat and terrain and population considerations, how far this will be implemented or implementable remains to be seen. While certainly there are pockets which the police and the para military would not be able to control and contain and may require the Army to step in but police fronting of operations would have to be the way ahead for military presence is not likely to solve the socio political challenges that are the key to revolutionary struggle in these areas. Whether the government has given up with the police option therefore remains to be seen.