Nov 2, 2010

Failure To Counter Naxalism in Bihar: An Indigenous View

Dr. Satish Kumar

Sr. Assistant Professor

MMH College, Meerut University

General

The Lakhisarai kidnapping episode exposed the perils of hands off counter Naxal approach of the Bihar government under Mr Nitish Kumar. A number of times during the crisis, the Chief Minister seemed to resign to the fate of kidnapped police personnel and appeared dependent on generosity of the Maoist forces. This helplessness of the State government was to say the least a pathetic approach which demonstrated weakness of the State. All the statements and moves made by the Chief Minister were to appease the Maoist forces. There was a sense of political forebodings driving the whole episode. Bihar’s month long elections which have commenced on 21 October were possibly at the back of Mr Nitish Kumar’s mind when handling the case.

This is not surprising. All political parties in Bihar are soft towards Maoists. The reasons are simple. To tap the votes of Dalits and other backward castes that are supposedly Maoist sympathizers like Kumbhars, Barais, and Lohars and so on. The total percentage of votes of these along with Dalits would be around 14 to 15 percent in the state. That affects the political arithmetic of many constituencies in Bihar.

It is due to this apathy of political parties to control violence that there has been a spurt of Maoist activities in Bihar in the last few months. Counterinsurgency operations have been either not been undertaken or are total failures. Kajra Hill has become a centre for Maoist activities and concentration of groups. The guerillas had hatched a plan to free top leader Mushafir Sahani from jail. The police failed to scale the intensity of Maoist presence in the areas.

Over the years Bihar has been one Naxal affected state where counterinsurgency operations have failed to make an impact. Jehanabad jail break is an example of state’s failure against Naxal spread. Many police personnel have been killed by the Naxals in the last few years. Naxals attempted to blast the Patna railway station in 2005.  A large quantity of arms and ammunition has been looted from police stations by the guerrillas. A loaded truck with explosives was seized in Patna recently. Gandhi Bridge and Koilwar Bridge are on the priority list of Maoists. There are fresh apprehensions of jail attacks. The state police have neither the numbers nor expertise to counter guerillas in different parts of the State. The gradual siege during Bhim Bandh in Munger district by Maoist makes it clear that state police force can do nothing except leaving the ground for Maoist forces to occupy.

A general breakdown of law and order, proliferation of criminal gangs and militias, criminalization of politics and an ill-equipped police force has contributed to continuous consolidation of Naxalite in the state. Naxal attacks in Bihar have increased before the Assembly elections. BDO of Tariyana block under Sheohar district was kidnapped by Maoist. Maoist burnt the road making machines in Chapra. There are fresh apprehensions of Jailbreak in different parts of the state.

Why have Counter Naxal Operations Failed in Bihar?

Counter Naxal operations have not been very effective in many Naxal affected states of India except Andhra Pradesh though the first phase of counterinsurgency against Naxalite was successful in West Bengal. The reasons are simple. The Maoists were fighting with bows, arrows and sticks against the state police force which were armed with rifles and other sophisticated weapons in the 1970’s. But the second phase especially after 1990s is different. Maoist guerillas today are capable of outgunning the state police force.  The most compelling explanation is the state’s inconsistent COIN [Counter Insurgency] approach.  Most of the initiatives taken by the state have a political motivation to lure voters of neglected communities of society. However Andhra Pradesh state’s strategy has worked to a large extent in containing the Maoist forces in the last few years. Why did the counterinsurgency plan fail to evolve in Bihar? Either in the case of Kazra Hill case in Lakhaisarai or Jehanabad Jail Break or scores of massacres that have taken place in the different districts of Bihar. A number of reasons could be identified.

1. Poor capability and numbers of Police in Bihar

The Central government is streamlining forces to fight against Naxalism. The capability of police forces in Naxal affected states is however very poor. Bihar is at the lowest scale in terms of population police ratio. United Nations recommends 220 police officers for every 100,000 population; India has an average of just 125. In Bihar, the ratio is as low as 60 for every 100,000.  As of 2009 Bihar had 19,624 vacancies in police force. The Union government has sought to fill the void by pumping in Central Reserve Police Force units in Bihar. Moreover a large number of police forces are deployed to protect politicians, bureaucrats and some influential people from other walks of life.

Bihar Police lack proper training and fail to counter attacks of Maoist forces. The lop-sided physical presence, loose morals and widespread corruption make the police unfit to challenge well-trained Maoist forces.  The 80,000 strong police force in Bihar also lacks access to modern vehicles and equipment like anti-landmine vehicles, bulletproof vests and bomb disposal equipment. According to the Bihar Police Association, a majority of about 300 police stations, 92 police pickets and many police outposts in Maoist-affected districts are facing severe infrastructure shortages and operate without reinforced boundary walls. Police stations — the basic unit on which any security response depends — are decrepit, and often lack modern communication systems. The Bihar government has not provided bullet-proof vehicles, high frequency wireless sets, night vision devices and anti-landmine vehicles to police in Naxalite-affected districts. In addition, jail modernization plan have yet to be implemented. Thus the forces have no meaningful capacity to meet the counter-insurgency challenges.

2.  A Divided Police Force in Bihar

Bihar’s police structure is divided on caste line. It has an historical reason. During the British Regime a large number of upper caste members of society were recruited as constable. Districts like Bhojpur and Chapra had more share in the police force.  Subsequently this trend of recruitment continued after independence. In the late 80s and beginning of 1990s, the OBC factor became more dominant in Indian politics shaped by Lalu Prasad Yadav and Nitish Kumar. Old practices of recruitment in the police force were challenged. Backward caste youth were recruited as constables. This led to a horizontal divide in the police force in Bihar on caste line. Quite often state and Naxal response to the crisis is also dictated by caste identity. The episode of Kazara Hill proves the same when the Naxalite released Abhay Yadav while they killed tribal policeman Lucas Tete. If the state police structure works on the caste line; how can the counterinsurgency plan be effective?

3. Mismanagement of Police Force

Naxals have recently changed their strategy targeting primarily police force and state infrastructure. Recent Naxal attacks in Bihar provide a clear indication of their new approach.  So, untrained and ill-equipped police become vulnerable to Naxal attacks. Nitish Kumar’s initiatives of recruiting the Special Auxiliary Forces (SAF) to fight against the Naxal outfits were appreciated by all. It was a very effective policy. The use of SAF definitely reposed confidence among the people. Many other states also plan to follow the Bihar model. Initially 5,000, ex-army men were recruited on two years contract. The procedure of screening was judged on merit. The age criteria were also followed strictly. 

Ironically, the same elite force is being mishandled and allowed to deteriorate by the police top brass with tacit consent of the political bosses. What is more irksome and demoralizing is that the elite force is now embroiled in petty issues.  A few of them were used to protect the VVIPS in Bihar. This mismanagement has led to decline of the SAF. A senior officer at the police headquarters, however, maintained that the SAF is being allowed to engage in normal law and order duties due to acute shortage of personnel in the constabulary rank. In a submission before the Patna High Court earlier this year, the Bihar Police disclosed that approximately 20,000 individuals, including politicians, present and former are given police protection.  In fact, change of focus and dilution of objectives have corrupted the elite force. The elite SAF is also seen extorting money from truck drivers on national highways. Most often, the Force is seen even regulating traffic and constitutes raiding parties to catch petty criminals. Such gross abuse has led to completely depleting the capacity of the counter Naxal police.

4. Gun Culture in Bihar

There are over 1,500 illegal arms manufacturing units in Bihar most of them located in Nalanda, Nawada, Gaya and Munger districts. Maoist forces are taking advantage of these illegal arms factories to arm their cadres. More over gun culture has so permeated society that many of the cadres are adept at handling weapons and do not hesitate in using the same.

5. Lack of Coordination between the Centre and state

Law and order comes under the state list thus it is primarily responsibility of the state to handle the Naxal militancy. The Centre acts on the request of a state to provide Para military forces or other reserve central forces for a short duration. Central forces move out once normalcy is restored. In November 2002, the Bihar government took steps to contain Naxalite activists, including a special task force and special operations groups to neutralize armed groups. But it turned out to be to a failure.  As the Naxalite insurgency grew, state governments generally took a “soft approach” such as attempting to negotiate peace agreements, enacting anti-terrorism laws and offering rehabilitation packages. This complicated the situation. There is need for the Union Ministry of Home Affairs to play a greater role in advising, supervising and assisting the state police. Increased coordination between states and centre is crucial given that Maoist operate across state borders. Given deficiencies in manpower in Maoist affected areas, lack of actionable intelligence is understandable. The state police thus need better intelligence. State security establishment will also have to study tactics and patterns of Maoist groups if they wish to succeed in COIN.

6. Lack of Political Will

Political leaders of Bihar are not in synch with ground reality. Their hands off approach are a result in the erroneous belief that this may affect their influence and vote bank in the Dalits. A large number of Dalits are neither Maoist nor do they support their ideology. There are some pockets where Dalits are being forced to toe the line of Maoist such as Jamui and Kazara hills where recent kidnapping of police took place. The reach of the state is minimal in these areas. The hope among Dalits has reached a nadir and for them the state does exist.  This provides ultra leftist forces adequate grounds to fill the void created by the state. Another indication of hands off approach was complete lack of political will of the state government. It does not have the courage to call Maoist as criminals in spite of killing of Bihar police personnel in fierce encounters. The hands off approach of the state government will continue to provide an opportunity to the Maoist to carry out hit and run attacks and will have larger implications during and after the elections of the state assembly. 

7: Maoist Build Up.

Naxalite groups have been in existence for nearly three decades.   The Communist Party of India (Maoist) have terrorized by attacking police and central security forces. Naxalite have sabotaged industrial projects, killed hundreds of “class enemies” such as landlords, business owners and money lenders, and assassinated political leaders and their family members. Naxalite groups have made tactical and organizational changes, particularly focusing on mass mobilization, which has allowed the movement to expand. Inadequate COIN responses of the Bihar government have failed to curb Naxalite activities and facilitated their growth. There are apprehensions that Naxal have established links with terrorist outfits across the region and have gone global. Their support system has expanded across the borders. 

Abundant natural resources of these areas provide Naxalite with revenue. Estimates suggest that the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) which has merged with the CPI M in 2004 extracted approximately 1 billion rupees from government offices, contractors, businessmen and industrialists. Other investigations found that, in parts of Bihar and Jharkhand contractors paid 30 per cent of allocated funds for various development projects as commission to the local MCC Commander. Naxalite groups have access to AK-47 rifles, landmines and impoverished devices (IED). Although PWG and MCC established underground production units, looting of weapons during attacks on security forces has been the main source of arms. Naxalite groups are also able to purchase weapon for arms smugglers, mainly in Bihar, where many illegal arms factories operate.

Conclusion

Due to proximity of the Nepal border external support is easy to obtain. Reports of the Home Ministry speak about Chinese made sophisticated arms having been smuggled and reached the hands of Maoist Guerrillas. Insufficient training of Bihar police has created a sense of abject surrender of the State to the guerrillas. A number of times police stations have been attacked and arms looted. So new capacities have to be built, tactics and techniques evolved to meet the Maoist challenge. It will need a strong political leadership to act based on the extra ordinary situation in Naxal affected districts and not under the influence of vote banks. The reality of the diverse nature of Naxal spread in Bihar must be factored in and counterinsurgency planned accordingly.

[The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent that of Security-risks.com or the Editor].

Related Article