Oct 6, 2009

Nuclear Fizzle Debate andits Effects on India'sNuclear Deterrence

Neha Kumar

Research Associate, USI

Introduction

            The controversial declaration by Dr K Santhanam thatIndia’s Hydrogen bomb test in 1998 was not successful has not only challengedthe government declaration but has also raised questions about India's nucleardoctrine, its self moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and adherence to CTBT.Santhanam said that “based on the seismic measurement and also from the opinionof the experts there was the much lower yield in the thermonuclear device testconducted at Pokhran in 1998.”[1]This stand has been supported by other scientists like PK Iyenger, but refutedstrongly by those in the government establishment. At the same time, reportsare pouring from the USabout increasing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan.There have also been reports about escalating Chinese intrusions into India'sborder raising concerns. It seems that Indiais facing challenges from its neighbours when it is not clear about its nuclearweapons efficacy. This brings us to the question how credible is India'snuclear policy under present conditions and whether Indiashould go in for more nuclear tests.

            The friction over India'snuclear tests is possibly a conflict between the government establishments. MrK. Santhanam while supporting the Indo-US nuclear Deal, mentioned in Mintnewspaper that, “On national security front, there are reasons to believe thatIndia's Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD) would not be affected by turn keypower reactors built by other countries. The accumulated weapon grade plutoniumin about 40 years of operating the CIRUS reactor (40MwT) and the relatively newDhruv (100MWT) has been exterminated to be sufficient for MCD.”[2]However, his views on the H bomb test per se seemed to challenge theconventional view. This article will try to examine India'snuclear fizzle debate in the context of the country’s nuclear doctrine.

India'sCredible Minimum Doctrine and India'sNuclear Fizzle Debate

            Indiahas adopted the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) in its NuclearDoctrine outlined in January 2003. It is important here to remember that thisDoctrine does not call for maintenance of large number of nuclear weapons butmentions only minimum number of nuclear weapons needed to inflict 'unacceptabledamage' to an adversary.[3] Assaid by Kenneth Waltz that 'Forces designed for war fighting have to becompared with each other. Forces designed for war deterring need not becompared. The question is not whether one country has less than other, butwhether it can do unacceptable damage to another country.'[4]The decisions on the limit of nuclear weapons are based on the assessment ofnuclear threats faced by the country.

            Presently, it is estimated that Indiahas approximately 100 nuclear weapons which are sufficient to causeunacceptable damage to its adversaries.[5]Regarding yield, critics say that the actual yield of India'snuclear bomb was 25+2 kilotons which is insufficient to maintain CMD.[6] Itshould be remembered that 15 kilo tone of atomic bomb has caused enormousdamage to Japanese cities. Even if Indiahas capability to produce only 25 kilotons of fission bombs, it maintains thecapability to ensure its CMD. Robert Batcher had published a paper on the Consequencesof an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war in 2004. It stated that a nuclear weapon of50 KT would result in 5000,000 casualties in Islamabad.Going by his analysis, 25 KT would result in 2500, 000 casualties- a numberwhich would be highly unacceptable to any rational country. Similarly, India's20 KT nuclear weapon could cause unacceptable damage to Chinaprovided Indiadevelops sufficient and accurate delivery vehicles. Beside this, after 1998nuclear tests, an official statement was issued which stated that Indiahas deliberately kept its nuclear yield low so as to prevent harmful effects onthe nearby villages.[7]Therefore, Indiadoes maintain CDM as per its nuclear doctrine in accordance with its nuclearposture. 

            In reality, Indiashould move away from the debate of H-bomb. Only a possession of nuclearweapons (fission or fusion) would not ensure CDM. Indiahas adopted No First Use (NFU) policy and counter city doctrine which calls forsurvivability of its nuclear arsenal. According to this doctrine, Indiashould be able to survive a nuclear attack to retaliate effectively. There aremany ways of ensuring survivability of nuclear forces like having mobilemissiles, hardening of missiles, development of nuclear SSBNs and developmentof Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).

            Considering India'snuclear doctrine, it is very important to ensure that there are sufficientnumbers of warheads and delivery systems which can survive a first strike andcan retaliate effectively. Similarly, it is important to have robust command andcontrol structure which should not only survive a nuclear attack but should beable to employ nuclear forces in shortest possible time. The survivability of India'snuclear forces is questionable, particularly, in case of Chinese attack. It isimportant for India'spolicy makers to understand these factors along with nuclear weapons to ensure‘CDM’ and 'second strike capability.' No one can deny that Indiacan produce fission bombs, and they alone could be sufficient for Indiato cause unacceptable damage. The focus and debate needs to shift from 'H bomb'to 'survivability of nuclear forces.'    

Effect of Nuclear FizzleDebate on India'sNuclear Deterrence

            Thomas Schelling defines deterrenceas, “persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoidcertain course of activity”.[8]  Deterrence involves a cost-benefit analysis,and works by convincing the enemy that the cost of taking action will outweighthe benefits. The decision to either go to war or maintain peace is takenkeeping in view consequences involved in a particular action, and anygovernment is not likely to go to war unless it foresees considerable advantageby doing so.[9]

            Deterrence depends on thecredibility of threat, which means the enemy should be capable enough to retaliateunder certain conditions. This capability should be combined withcommunication, and the enemy should be given clear messages about how thethreats could be mutually beneficial. Therefore, capability and credibility aretwo important components of deterrence. Capability depends on military forcewhile credibility depends on effective communications to convince the enemythat threat is real.

            This shows that communicating a credible threat to anenemy about one's own nuclear weapons capability is very important. In case ofongoing debate, Indiais giving messages to its adversaries that it is not sure about the capabilityof its nuclear weapons. This is happening particularly when our adversaries areemboldened. According to the recent report by Bulletin of Atomic Scientiststitled 'Pakistan Nuclear Forces 2009,' Pakistanhas an estimated arsenal of 70-90 nuclear weapons and a new nuclear ballisticmissile is under development. Two new plutonium production reactors and asecond chemical separation facility are also under construction.[10]Under such conditions, Pakistan wouldfeel that it has outplayed India in therealm of nuclear weapons and thus will be emboldened. Pakistan will bemore prompt to go for limited conventional war with India under itsnuclear umbrella.

            Similarly,China has beentroubling India on itsclaims over Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. China regards Tibet as a palmwhich has five fingers namely Ladakh, Sikkim,Nepal,Bhutan,and North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) or Arunachal Pradesh. Chinahas never given up its territorial claims, particularly, where the other partyhas been weak. Although refuted by the government, clearly, Chinacontinues to be a threat against India.Chinahas recently carried out intrusions of the Line of Actual Control in the Ladakhsector.[11]According to Indian defence officials, there were 270 line of controlviolations by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and 2,285 instances of'aggressive border patrolling' in 2008.[12]  This shows that Chinais in no mood to give up its territorial claims.

Then Why Such Debate?

            The question is why Indiais having a debate over the veracity of the H bomb tests? What will Indiagain by engaging in such a debate? One reason for this debate is possibly arecognition that Indiais not yet ready for signing CTBT. The Obama administration has been unable togather necessary majority in Senate for ratification of the treaty. However,recent events like North Korea’ssecond Nuclear Test and Iran'sdetermination to build nuclear weapons may force the Senate to reconsider CTBT.Under such conditions, other non-signatories states will be forced toreconsider their decision on CTBT and Indiais one of such country. Indiamay be pressurised by the USto reconsider its stance on CTBT. Such statements may be inform India'sleaders and international community that Indiadoes not have sufficient nuclear weapons to claim 'credible minimum deterrence'and needs more nuclear tests. Therefore, Indiacould not be part of CTBT.

            However, what is forgotten is that Indiahas exercised self moratorium after nuclear tests of 1998. Besides this, Indiahas given up its right to test nuclear weapons after conclusion of Indo-USnuclear deal. The then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice has already mentionedthat 'Let me reassure you that an Indian test, as I havetestified publicly, would result in most serious consequences. Existing U.S.law would require automatic cut-off of cooperation, as well as a number ofother sanctions, if Indiawere to test. After 60 continuous session days, the President could waive thetermination of cooperation if he determined that the cut-off would be'seriously prejudicial' to U.S.non-proliferation objectives or 'otherwise jeopardize the common defence andsecurity.'[13]Therefore, whether Indiasigns CTBT or not, it has ipso facto given up its right of testing nuclearweapons.

            The other way to ensure credibility of nuclear weapons isto carry out laboratory tests. One could always argue that Indiashould sign the CTBT, whether these tests are successful or not, provided itseeks concessions from the US.Earlier, the UShad made secret arrangements with Franceto provide it technical assistance as well as cooperation with US nuclearweapon laboratories to enhance computer simulation to maintain the reliabilityof nuclear weapons. Indiaalso approached the USfor help but the same was denied as it was non-nuclear weapon state. Indiahas to think twice before signing these treaties because it lacks state of arttechnology for testing. Indiashould see whether it is able to carry out sub-critical tests or laboratorytests that are not prohibited by CTBT and do not produce radioactive yield.

             Indo-US nucleardeal does recongnise Indiaas a nuclear power. The division of India'snuclear facilities into military and civilian has been accepted by IAEA. Thisclearly recognizes Indiaas a country which has the capability for 'military use of nuclear weapons.'Therefore, there should be no reason for rejecting CTBT as circumstances todayare different from what it used to exist at the time of the ClintonAdministration. Presently, the only reason for rejection of this treaty is,lack of confidence in the international non-proliferation treaties. It has beengenerally assumed that these treaties failed to do any good to stopinternational proliferation and are only meant to divide world into 'haves' and'haves not.' It is important to change such presumptions,

Conclusion

            Indiadoes not have any viable reasons to shun CTBT. Homi Sethna has rightly saidthat scientists should not interfere in political matters. The decision to goor not to go for CTBT is a political one and should not be mixed withscientific misperceptions. On the other hand, second strike capability is vitalto our nuclear doctrine and every step should be taken to ensure it. Besidesit, Indiais still inferior to Chinain many areas. One such realm is that of anti satellite weapons. Chinahas successfully tested anti satellite weapon (ASAT) in 2007 and this could beharmful for Indian satellites. Indiashould also move in this direction. These are the main areas on which ourscientific community should concentrate rather than narrowing their debate tojust H-bomb.

[Disclaimer - The views expressed in thisarticle are entirely that of the author and donot represent that ofSecurity-risks.com or the Editor].