Apr 29, 2008

Sino Russian Defence Relationship : Undergoing Transformation

The main stay of People Liberation Army modernization has been supply of Russian equipment. Thus there has been a steady flow of Russian aircraft, frigates, submarines and even hovercraft to Beijing over the years. A recent report in the Ria Novosti however indicated that this special relationship was undergoing a change despite the largely successful exercise Peace Mission 2007 involving Russian and Chinese troops along with other Central Asian militaries. For the first time Moscow is showing signs of concern over supply of high technology military equipment to China. Perhaps Russia has realized that Chinese capability to absorb and reverse engineer technology has increased exponentially. Thus Beijing would be able to produce excellent copies of Russian ships and submarines in the years to come. China`s growing economic power also implies that with a modern military, Moscow will not be able to coerce Beijing with its superior weaponry and powerful military. 

The first signs of a slow down in relationship are as per Ria Novosti are the lack of meetings of Russian and Chinese intergovernmental commission for the last two years whereas it was an annual or even a biannual feature previously. There are also no major Chinese contracts pending with the Russian defence industry and Russian arms exporters do not expect any increase in sales volumes to China which had reached $6.5 billion. 

The latest equipment delivered to China by Russia are four Project 956-E Sovremenny-class destroyers featuring 3M-80E Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) supersonic anti-ship missiles, two Project 877-EKM Varshavyanka (Kilo)-class diesel-electric attack and two Project 636 Amur (improved Kilo)-class submarines with Club-C anti-ship missile systems built at the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Sukhoi Su-27MKK fighter assembly kits, as well as AL-31F engines and avionics have also been delivered, to an aircraft plant in Shengyang. The contracts pertaining to S-300PMU and Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have also been fulfilled. 

What is critical however is the Ilyushin Il-76MD, strategic lift aircraft which would have added to Chinese rapid reaction capability has not been supplied so far as the Chkalov Aircraft Production Plant in Tashkent, Uzbekistan could not deliver the planes. Russian efforts to shift this production to Ulyanovsk Aircraft Plant in the Volga region have also not succeeded.

The report also goes on to state that the General Armaments Department of the People's Liberation Army is keen to buy large batches of Russian-made Shmel (Bumblebee) rocket infantry flame-throwers, 120mm Nona-SVK and Vena self-propelled guns, 152mm Msta-S self-propelled artillery systems, 300mm Smerch (Tornado) multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs), T-90S main battle tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), Mil Mi-28N Havoc and Kamov Ka-50 Hokum "Black Shark" attack helicopters, various types of three-dimensional radars, naval Shtil-1 R-29RM (SS-N-23) surface-to-air missiles on vertical launchers, as well as electronic counter-measures (ECM) systems, Ka-27 and Helix Ka-28 ship-borne helicopters, know-how for manufacturing fourth-generation and fifth-generation aircraft engines, highly alloyed steels and other materials. This indeed is a long list of varied equipment which would greatly increase the mobility, fire power and surface as well as air forces capability of the PLA in the years to come.

This would be a sizeable order for the Russian arms industry. However the Chinese are increasingly demanding production licenses and more advanced weaponry with joint production capability which the Russians have been reluctant to provide recently. Russian experience with RD 93 aircraft engines which were transferred by China to Pakistan to be installed in the JF 17 fighter could have dissuaded Moscow from a across the board military production support to Beijing.

Despite its many advances in indigenisation, China is faced with problems of full scale production of high grade weapons and systems. Metallurgy is one of the key problems faced by Beijing. Reports after Peace Mission 2007 indicate that the suspension of the Chinese APCs and 100 mm self propelled guns failed in the rugged terrain at the Russian 34 th Motorized Rifle Divisions training facility near Chebarkul in the Urals. Metal fatigue is reportedly identified as a major cause in the preliminary inquiries.

There is no doubt that both Russia and China need to go ahead with defence equipment relationship. The issue is how this can be established equitably. Both sides appear to be attempting a hard bargain. Beijing is trying to reduce orders to Moscow and is also looking towards other suppliers including European defence agencies though European Union sanctions prevents these nations from supplying weapons to Beijing. With all European nations less UK facing falling sales of military equipment, a review of EU policy may come about, if Beijing tries hard to convince them that Tiananmen square is way behind and the new image of China is that of Olympics 2008. Greater engagement could well induce Russia to offer favourable terms in the future.

India is also faced with more aggressive pricing policy by Moscow, but is relatively comfortably placed due to the well entrenched defence relationship between the two countries. Thus while there may be some review of prices, the flow of Russian equipment along with production licenses and technology transfers is likely to continue apace. Russia is also not worried about India`s increased regional clout as there is no clash of interests between the two countries.

PLA Buglers: Information Warriors on the Front Line

One of the most interesting news about the People`s Liberation Army (PLA) flashed recently by Xinhua is return of buglers in the PLA. Quoting, Sgt. Zhang Gaosen, of the Jinan Military Area Command the report stated that, "Being a bugler was not a promising career in the past," but things are changing and buglers are much in demand he claimed. Some may believe that buglers may be, "on call" for the Beijing Olympics less than a year away. However there are deeper operational reasons for the PLA reviving the art of bugling.

In the years gone by, buglers would rouse an army to battle or simply soldiers from their sleep at the break of dawn. Identification of a bugle call was one of the first lessons in training young recruits for unless one recognized the call correctly one could be missing out on an important routine or order of the day. The bugle call of Retreat at the end of the day was especially significant as it not just signified preparations for the night but also was a tribute to the innumerable martyrs who had laid down their lives for the country.

But over the years as alarm calls, sirens, hooters and networked wireless megaphones have proliferated buglers have taken a back seat in the armed forces. However the threat of jamming of communications in the thick of a modern battle; electronic and information warfare has led to increase in interest in bugling in the Chinese armed forces.

Such fall back on old systems to beat modern technology has many precedents. As the world was moving on to transistorized communications, some observers were surprised to find that the then Soviet Army persisted with valve radios on their critical communication equipment. Obviously the Soviets were protecting themselves from the Electro Magnetic Pulse that would have neutralized transistors but not the valves. The Chinese seem to drawing similar lessons based on a much more antiquated yet reliable tradition of armies of the World, bugling to beat electronic warfare.

The PLA is no novice to organizational innovation. It has the unique ability of maximizing its strengths. Thus it was People`s War when Mao`s Army lacked big guns, or human wave attacks in Korea or an anti satellite strike in 2007. Information warfare has been the PLA`s key focus over the years. In the 1990`s, two Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the PLA Air Force Political Department published a seminal work, "Unrestricted Warfare" which revealed the PLA`s thinking on new methods and techniques for gaining political advantage against possible adversaries. Information warfare was a key concept propagated then.

Today PLA is reportedly having full scale information warfare capability with an offensive and defensive component. Recent reports in the media indicate that possibly one or many cyber attacks were carried out by the Chinese military on US military`s computer system in June this year. US officials claim that these have been by the People`s Liberation Army (PLA). One such attack even led to shutting down of computers in the offices of Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary. While official comments were guarded, as it is always difficult to trace out such attacks and a number of states as well as non state entities are reported to be carrying out such attempts regularly, yet alarm bells are already ringing in information security circles across the globe.

Another report speaks of hacking by Chinese into German government systems including computer networks at Chancellor Merkel`s office. This issue was reportedly raised during the meet between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Beijing recently. One would have imagined that the networks of the German Chancellor and Secretary Gates would be virtually penetrable. Yet the all pervasiveness of information warfare perhaps provides opportunities for penetrating even such highly secure systems. So what do we do with Chinese buglers when they give their calls to the PLA soldiers, "counter bugler warfare", may increasingly engage the hyper active security specialists across the globe.

Mahan, Malabar and China

China `s quest for great nationhood passes through the waters of the Indian Ocean . Chinese strategists have perhaps concluded that the rise of great nations is determined by the size of their navies. As China seeks to rise to greater glories, a Navy is assuming increasing importance for Beijing . Moreover an economy which is dependent on inward flow of raw materials including oil and gas and the outward transportation of goods by sea cannot neglect the oceans. China `s wealth is concentrated on the Eastern coast, thus it has to ensure that this is protected. For this purpose, there is no option but to develop a strong Navy. Chinese main tactical concerns are denial of access to the coastal areas, thus the anti access strategy propagated by the PLA.

A study of Mahan and his naval strategy is also engaging many commanders of the Chinese Navy. For like Mahan`s initial doubts of employment of an emergent US Navy, PLAN the Chinese Navy has to figure out what to do with a naval muscle that is growing each day. For China the problems are even more daunting than America of the 19 th Century. For the United States was not faced with a major challenger in the seas till post Meiji Japan emerged on the Pacific horizon. While Britain had a strong navy it was also a very staunch ally. China is facing competition in the oceans from many powers with long traditions of naval warfare.

Despite extensive investment of resources, both manpower and capital, the Chinese are not likely to be able to match the US Navy in the next 50 years or more. Lack of naval tradition will restrict Chinese plans in the future. Thus China is building an asymmetric naval capability with large sized submarine fleet. Simultaneously rumours of Chinese building an air craft carrier persist, but that is a long way off. Unlike other regional countries including Japan and India and also Thailand, China has no experience and expertise in employment or manning an air craft carrier. While the Chinese are fast learners, their ability to assimilate the complex operations involved in running an aircraft carrier may be constrained by steepness of the learning curve.

The United States is not the only ocean faring worry for the Chinese, Japan is just across the board and represents a major traditional threat. The Japanese are increasingly assertive in extending the reach of the maritime self defence forces in the Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean. Japan is providing refuelling facilities to all US ships in the area, a consequence of which is growing tension between the ruling and opposition parties in the country and which is said to have partially contributed to the resignation of Prime Minister Abe. Of course the Chinese may have been pleased with this event, though the stoicism bred by Confucius will prevent them to comment on what is, "strictly an internal matter of a friendly neighbour". No doubt there would be some glee over the frailties of democratic systems.

But China`s major maritime worry is India. India not only has a strong Navy but also occupies a central position astride the Indian Ocean. This enables the Indian Navy to dominate the waters to the great detriment of PLAN, so feels Beijing. However the final concern emerges when all the three navies, Indian, Japan and the United States conduct an exercise in the Bay of Bengal practicing what could only be seen as joint manoeuvres, surely not anti terrorism exercises professed by exercise planners and spin masters.

Thus the Chinese attempting to understand naval stratagems espoused by Mahan are confronted with the problem of the Malabar manoeuvres in their prime area of interest, through which all of China`s oil passes, mouth of the Malacca straits. Here the Chinese see not one, not two but three potential competitors disrupting their vital life lines, in the same way that Mahan propounded in his treatise. Now we know why the Chinese protested over Malabar, its Mahan`s teachings, for if the alliance of nations grows, China`s so called string of pearls in the Indian Ocean may prove inadequate to protect Beijing`s interests.

Air Power In The Neighbourhood : PLAAF
By Group Captain (Retired) T P Srivastava

Introduction

The Chinese Air Force is the largest air power segment in our neighbourhood. In terms of the number of aircraft, Chinese Air Force( Peoples Liberation Army Air Force:PLAAF), is the third largest in the world. In our context when we look at PLAAF capability, it is essentially in relation to PLAAF`s ability to operate from Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Ability of PLAAF to operate from mainland China and strike targets in India remains on paper. The discussion in the succeeding paras is confined only to conventional Air Power.

Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) - Military Regions

In order to evaluate PLAAF capability, a thorough understanding of TAR is essential with respect to terrain. Of the seven Military Regions(MR) of the Chinese Armed Forces, only two are opposite India. Lanzhou MR is opposite LADAKH sector and Chengdu MR is opposite the North-East and part of the Central Sector. The MRs are further sub-divided into Military Districts(MD). The MDs facing us are:-

• Chengdu MR. The two MDs in this region are Yunnan (opposite Myanmar) and Xizang( opposite Assam, Sikkim and Arunachal)
• Lanzhou MR. South Xingjian MD (opposite UP,HP and LADAKH) East Xingjian MD faces us adjoining LADAKH.

Airfields

There are 15 operational bases in these two regions from where PLAAF can launch air operations. If we consider the TBA, the number of airfields reduce to only five. These airfields are:-

• Khotan - (Lanzhou MR)
• Hoping
• Kongka Dzong - (Chengdu MR)
• Donshoon
• Pangta

Except for Khotan, the other four airfields are at an average elevation of 4,000 metres. Khotan at 1400 metres is nearly at the same elevation as Srinagar. Simply put the aeroplane and human being are affected by the altitude in identical manner. Both start puffing and panting with increase in altitude. Other ten airfields in the region are Kashgar, Kunming, Paoshan, Jekundo, Chegdu, Petun, Mangshi, Nagchuka I&II and Kantse. Long range aircraft like Su-30 only can reach the TBA while operating from these bases with limited load.

Air Defence Set Up

Radar Cover. Medium and High level cover in TAR is fairly good inspite of the fact that vintage radars are still in use. However low level cover is virtually non-existent due to terrain as well as less number of Radars. VA`s and VP`s have limited low level cover as well.

AD Weapons. Vintage AD weapons comprising mostly of Ack-Ack guns are deployed. Low level SAM,s are limited in numbers and are deployed at the VA/VP.

Type of Aircraft

Theoretically PLAAF could deploy the Q5, IL - 28 and J 8 aircraft but having low loiter time and insignificant throw weight, it is only Su-27/30 which will remain effective in TAR. Employment of Tu-16,if at all, would primarily have a psychological impact.

Airlift Capability

Airlift capability of PLAAF in TAR is severely restricted due to altitude at which most of the airfields are located. To place the issue in perspective, it would be well worth noting that most of the PLAAF airfields in TAR are at a higher altitude than Leh and Thoise. Thus their performance will be much lower than that of the Indian Air Force IL-76 from Leh on a day when surface temperatures are around 25-30 degrees Celsius. To conceive of operations like a Battalion Group drop would be virtually impossible from the point of view of the success probability that such drop may have. Similarly Heliborne operations are extremely difficult to execute. A Mi-17, which can lift 2000Kg at sea level, would lift a mere few hundred Kg at altitudes in excess of 3 Km. Contingency of an Heliborne assault in this region has a remote chance of success.

Overall Capability of PLAAF In TAR

Keeping in view the facts stated above PLAAF capability in TAR can be summarized as follows:-

• Strike element of PLAAF is centred around Su-27/30. Other aircraft in the inventory have extremely limited capability.
• Airfield infrastructure, though exists, but cannot support sustained operations due to unpredictable and inclement weather.
• TBA is located widely separated from the base.
• Strategic targets in mainland India e.g. airfields in eastern region are more than 500 km from PLAAF strike bases in TAR.
• Air Defence infrastructure, radar cover in particular is virtually non-existent almost entirely due to terrain restrictions.

Conclusion

PLAAF capability in TAR is severely restricted and would remain so virtually for all times to come even if force multipliers from main land China join the battle, PLAAF would not be in a position to cause any significant attrition to Indian Ground or Air Force. However if the Diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China continue to improve and Myanmar allows PLAAF to operate from its bases, PLAAF shall pose a serious challenge. Thus PLAAF operating from TAR poses no significant challenge/threat.

(SAST AUGUST 2007)

Peace Mission 2007 - Chinese Military Political Venture in Central Asia

While the World has been engaged in other parts of Asia; West, South and South East, Central Asia has been relatively in the back ground over the past few years. Yet China in concert with Russia is slowly making inroads into the region. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001 by six nations, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Together the countries comprise 25 percent of the population of the globe at approximately 1.5 billion; of course most of this comes from China`s large people base of 1.3 billion. So that means the balance of approximately 220 million belongs to rest of the SCO countries. Leaving out Russia`s over 140 million; the Central Asian states have a populace of mere 80 million. The people numbers asymmetry is thus a major factor in the SCO, which will provide China a considerable advantage in the years ahead.

The SCO is also becoming China`s principal vehicle of entry into Central Asia. Nothing would perhaps indicate this trend better than holding of a major exercise, Peace Mission 2007 from 9 to 17 August, culminating simultaneously with the SCO Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese contingent the second largest comprised of 1,700 People's Liberation Army personnel, 46 aircraft, G-9 and Mi-17 helicopters, G-7A fighters, IL-76 transports and JH-7A "Flying Leopard" fighter-bombers. While Russia was the major contributor, Central Asian states contributed just company and platoon sized contingents.

The focus of the exercise was touted as a counter terrorist drill. The aim of Peace Mission 2007 however appears to be much larger, a signal to the global community of a new alignment emerging in Asia, focused on the energy chain of Central Asia, a politically sensitive but security deficient region, on the flanks of other sensitivities of the West, Iran and Afghanistan

As per China Daily, "SCO cooperation over security has gone beyond issues of regional disarmament and borders, for it includes how to deal with non-traditional threats such as terrorists, secessionist forces and extremist religious groups". The reaction from Chinese Xingjian dissidents was characteristically vitriolic. Writing on behalf of the Uighur natives of Xingjian, Alim Seytoff insists that the aim of Peace Mission 2007 is clearly to suppress the Uighurs' of Xingjian referred as East Turkestan and warn democratic forces in Central Asia not to challenge the authoritarian regimes. The collective efforts of the governments of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were deemed to be to ensure that any uprising by the Uighur population of these states is suppressed and Peace Mission 2007 was a part of this overall effort claims Alim writing in Asia Times Online.

When correlated to the stated purpose of the joint anti-terrorist manoeuvres, "Peace Mission 2007" by Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, State Councillor and Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan, to "demonstrate determination of the SCO member states in the fight against three evil forces: extremism, terrorism and separatism, as well as the common desire to ensure security and stability in the region, stimulate the general development and prosperity," the linkage could be more evident.

Another salient facet was, Urumqi, the capital of China's Xingjian-Uighur Autonomous Area. It was one of the two main locations of conduct of the Exercise with the firing range of the Russian Army's 34th Motorized Rifle Division near Chebarkul town, about 50 miles (80 km) west of Chelyabinsk, in Russia's Volga-Urals Military District being the other. The movement of forces from one area to another also demonstrated high level of strategic mobility and quick reaction capability within the region by the military forces.

While Russia bore the entire expenditure for the exercises of almost 2 million Roubles ($ 80 million) for Peace Mission 2007, the Chinese could gainfully employ the occasion to spread their military and political influence in Central Asia. Suppressing the militancy in Xingjian is a priority for the Chinese and they are well aware of the need for regional cooperation in Central Asia to achieve this aim. SCO has been an ideal medium and Peace Mission 2007 a tool for expansion in the region so effectively used by Beijing to achieve these dual aims. (SAST SEP 2007)

Pentagon Report on China - India `s Points of Interest

The Annual Report to Congress by the Pentagon entitled, "Military Power of the

People`s Republic of China 2007" provides a broad overview of capabilities developed by Beijing over a period and the possible trajectory of Chinese security thinking. China is stated to be pursuing long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities for, "power projection, anti-access, and anti denial". Development of military force in concert with China `s status in international polity and growth of economy are seen as concurrent events.

This is represented by Chinese missile force accretion to include deployment of improved version of the DF 31 series, DF 31 A likely to be operationalised in 2007. This system has a projected range of over 11,000 kms. In addition the JL 2 submarine launched ballistic missile is also being developed for deployment on the JIN class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. This missile has a range of 8000 kms. While missiles of CSS 2 class and beyond have ranges covering the entire Indian Sub Continent, Chinese short range ballistic missiles as CSS 6 and CSS 7 are also seen to have a capability to reach their claimed territories both in the Eastern and the Western sectors of India`s Northern borders. Availability of a large number of launchers and missiles make these a potent threat. Improvement of command and control and targeting of the missiles is also likely to come about given Chinese development of reconnaissance and communication systems.

China `s naval forces are said to include 72 principal combatants, some 58 attack submarines, about 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels, and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft. Of consequence is testing of second generation JIN class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine and the SHANG class nuclear powered attack submarines which are under trial since 2005. Chinese interests in building an aircraft carrier have been well documented.

The principal air warfare capabilities include production of SU 27 SMK fighter under licensed agreement with Russia and deployment of SU 30 MKK fighter bomber with a naval variant the SU 30 MK2. China is also deploying an indigenously produced attack helicopter the Z 10 which is undergoing flight testing. China `s 1.4 million ground forces personnel are primarily deployed to the three military regions opposite Taiwan which are being upgraded with tanks, APCs and additional artillery pieces including the third generation MBT, ZTZ - 99.

Chinese Policy

Chinese policy is said to be underpinned by the need to maintain primacy of the Chinese Communist Party internally. To ensure which concepts such as nationalism and improved economic performance are used to sustain ideological support to the Communist regime. Chinese relations with its neighbours are also shaped by the need to ensure that spill over effects of democracies in adjoining areas does not affect Beijing . Thus perhaps China is comfortable with a military junta in Myanmar than having to deal with a democracy. The three unresolved boundary disputes which China persists are with Japan in East China Sea , India and with South East Asian states in the South China Sea . Chinese single minded persuasion of its interests needs no recounting; the recent incident of denial of visa to the IAS officer from Arunachal is the most recent manifestation.

Outlining the November 2006, PRC President Hu Jintao visit to India as a key event, the Pentagon Report states that this was a first visit to India by a PRC head of state in ten years. This demonstrates the importance China places on improving ties with India while preserving its strategic relationship with Pakistan . Given Chinese penchant for symbolism, the conclusion of Pentagon analysts seems quite significant. Apparently, China like the USA will balance its relationship with India in the years ahead.

Chinese Concept of Strategy

Chinese concept of strategy is based on the model of comprehensive national power (CNP) and strategic configuration of power. CNP is used to evaluate Chinese capabilities in relation to other countries based on a qualitative and quantitative measure of territory, natural resources, economy, diplomatic influence, international prestige, domestic cohesiveness, military capability and cultural influence. China `s think tanks using economic, military and diplomatic parameters have ranked the nation sixth in the World powers and the national development strategy is to ensure a systematic increase in Chinese CNP.

The concept of strategic configuration of power or, "shi" is seen to be roughly equivalent of balance of power wherein the rise and fall of global and regional powers is continuously profiled to attain a national status in the power configuration. In this context and with a resource based area of interest, China is seen to balance and compete with the US , Japan and India in areas which are in the outer periphery of Chinese influence.

Chinese Military Doctrine

Chinese doctrine is based on emphasis on joint operations and logistics under informatized conditions with long range mobility. The Chinese want to develop a force to fight and win local wars under conditions of informatization. This is the basis of Chinese transformation. The first pillar of Chinese strategy is said to be active defence which implies defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. But the Chinese as the Pentagon Report has highlighted also denote attacks as the one against India in 1962 as a part of active defence.

Two issues raised in the Pentagon Report on Chinese strategy need some comment. The first is development of a pre-emptive strategy. The Report posits that Chinese military transformation has provided it a capability for pre-emption which is also likely to be supported by a doctrine. The capabilities indicative of such a move are acquisition of Su - 30 strike and F - 10 fighter aircraft with offensive precision strike power, large number of short range ballistic missiles (900) deployed within the range of Taiwan, abilities for information, electronic and computer network operations, long range military command and control and communication systems, submarines and unmanned combat aerial vehicles provide the PLA additional capability for pre-emption.

The second issue of concern is Chinese emphasis on a comprehensive view of warfare which includes use of a combination of conventional, information and asymmetric capabilities to target economic, financial, information, legal and psychological elements of Chinese war planning. Thus war is considered an all-inclusive culmination of targeting politics, economy, diplomacy as well as legal instruments to undermine the moral, legal and political ability of the opponent`s will to fight. This is more or less an allusion to Clausewitzian trinity of people, government and the military expanded to Warden`s five rings model to include economy and information.

Development of Military Capability

The present focus of China `s military capability is stated to be based on preventing Taiwan `s independence and later to compel the Island to negotiate a settlement on terms dictated by Beijing . In the next phase modernization is designed to attain broader regional and global goals. The Pentagon Paper states that China should be able to defeat a moderate size adversary by the end of 2010. Joint operations, precision delivery, logistics and communication networks are central to capability building. Theatre ballistic missiles, Special Forces and computer network attacks are all being concurrently developed to engage the enemy decisively. An array of cruise, ballistic, anti radiation weapons and artillery delivery high precision ammunition is considered as central to the precision armoury being developed by the Chinese. They are also reported to be having training facilities replicating the Sino Indian border apart from other areas of possible conflict where mock practices are being conducted. Analysis of the Defence budget reveals that the Chinese Defence Budget for 2007 estimated at $ 45 billion could actually stretch to as much as $ 85 to 125 billion considering strategic forces, acquisitions from abroad and paramilitary forces budgets.

Comments by the Chinese

Pentagon`s yearly ritual tends to focus on Chinese capability building rather than threat assertion. The Chinese have been sceptical of intents of the Pentagon exercise and protested this as infringement of their sovereign right to develop their military capability. There can be no two views about this assertion. Thus Chinese have been critical of intents of aggression, increase in defence budgets and scrutiny of modernization programmes of the country. This has been reflected by comments by Chinese scholars as well as official sources. Yang Yi, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies under the National Defence University of China, is reported to have said, "While intervening in China 's internal affairs, the commanding tone of the report displays more bias than reason." ( China Daily). Media reports in China said, "This report is strikingly distorted about the 'Chinese military threat' and is really just too exaggerated."

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu firmly castigated the contention in the report indicating that, "The report exaggerates China's military strength and expenditure with ulterior motives. It disseminates the ' China threat' theory, severely violates norms of international relations and wantonly interferes with China's internal affairs. As a peace-loving country China sticks to a path of peaceful development and adopts a defensive national defense policy. The international community has a fair judgment that China is an important force in promoting peace in the Asia-Pacific and the world".

Possible Deductions for India

The long term growth trajectory of Chinese defence capabilities should be a foregone conclusion, given Beijing`s focused and disciplined approach in building Comprehensive National Power and then applying it within constraints and opportunities provided by a Strategic Configuration of Power. China `s lack of accommodation over the boundary issue needs to be viewed from two perspectives, first as a matter of principle carried forward through the legacy of past realities; the other a more cynical view would be to retain leverages in the long term. Thus India and Japan remain the only two states with which there has been no accommodation so far. Development of communications in Tibet is another area which denotes not just issues of infrastructure growth but also that of military capabilities.

But the Chinese are pragmatists, hence would expand their opportunity and threat paradigms based on the proverbial, `Shi`. An appropriate arrow from the quiver of politics, economics, trade, military and information will thus be used to gain strategic advantage. Thus a holistic, long term appraisal and capability development paradigm by the Indian security establishment is called for, not for confronting China per se, but to maintain an appropriate balance thereby avoiding asymmetry which may be seen as an opportunity for exploitation by Beijing in the future.

SAST JUNE 2007

China `s Military Modernization - An Aircraft Carrier?

The focus of China `s military modernization at present is to gain a military edge against Taiwan by 2010 as per Jane`s Defence Weekly. Towards this end the Chinese are developing the Navy, Missiles and air force. The build up is primarily through military cooperation with Russia . Thus next in the line are said to be Sukhoi Su-33 multi-role fighter aircraft: a carrier version of the Su-27 fighter. Moves of the PLA Naval Air force to establish a combat air wing are also quite advanced. The Chinese aviation industry is also being spurred to produce fighters, surveillance and early warning aircraft. China is also linking this effort with development of the civil aviation industry with focus on heavy lift aircraft. Given China `s geographical extent and population this make eminent sense as it would facilitate move of large number of personnel military and civil across the country.

The most debated Chinese project remains that of building the aircraft carrier.

A report in South Korean media indicated in March that China was expected to build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the 90000-ton class which will enter service in 2020.

Chinese scholars and officials such as Huang Qiang, a spokesman for the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence of China (CSTIND) maintain that while, China is capable of building an aircraft carrier Chinese philosophy is of,

"strategic active defence and, even when it owns aircraft carriers, it will definitely not intrude into or occupy any other nation or resort to force with the use of carrier vessel," This may provide some pointers to Beijing `s thinking on the subject. Other researchers as Li Jie of the Institute of Naval Military Academy indicate that "To build an aircraft carrier is not merely an "aircraft carrier" issue but poses an image of a nation, apart from producing a tremendous deterrent" though he goes on to add that this is not feasible technologically. The Chinese view of, `prestige` can be evident with even Thailand possessing an air craft carrier in the ASEAN region.

The fact is that while China does not feel the necessity of an aircraft carrier at present, Beijing `s moves to acquire bases across the Indian Ocean periphery denotes that some day it may base its naval fleet on a carrier. Maritime strategists will then have to devise appropriate responses.

(SAST MAY 2007)

The Chinese PLA Navy

The PLA Navy is considered by many as the weakest link in the Chinese Armed Forces. As China increases its trade and imports of raw materials, safety and security of the sea lanes are assuming importance. Thus the Chinese have undertaken extensive efforts to upgrade the PLA Navy. Naval up gradation keeping in view the constant need to pose a credible threat to Taiwan is also necessary. Thus missiles, 1000 of which are reportedly aligned towards Taipei and a potent marine force are two major arms of China`s, Taiwan strategy.

The Chinese are conscious of their weakness in the naval field and have been projecting naval power at ever opportunity. One such occasion was the Peace or Aman 07 exercises held in the Arabian Sea under Pakistan`s aegis. The key facets of the drills include conduct of multinational exercises for mid sea operations including search and rescue. The Chinese had fielded two ships, guided missile frigates Lianyungang and Sanming. During these exercises Senior Colonel Qiu Yanpeng (L1) was provided an opportunity to command the multi national forces during one of the phases of the exercise. Firing practices on the high seas and multinational helicopter operations were also conducted during this period.

A detailed report on participation of Chinese frigates in multinational exercises has been covered in, "Liberation Army Daily" excerpts of which have been reproduced in People`s Daily. Some of the achievements proclaimed include first participation of a Chinese naval vessels in a joint maritime exercise which involved not just new procedures but also a new language, the high level of readiness and equipment maintenance of the ships, extensive stocking undertaken for the period which amounted to provisions for 40 days as against normal supplies for 15 days. During the exercises the commander of the Chinese flotilla, Senior Colonel Qiu Yanpeng`s performance in directing the joint maritime rescue operation received maximum kudos as, "The Chinese officer, calmed and composed, performed his duty with flying colours, and accomplished the drilling task an hour in advance as scheduled". (Extracted from People`s Daily Online).

China is also reported to be building the first aircraft carrier by 2010. This will provide it large off shore capabilities enhancing potential in the South China Seas. This is reported to have been revealed by a Chinese officer of the rank of Lt General or equivalent.

(SAST APRIL 2007)

China`s Defence White Paper

White papers are major instruments of transparency which comprehensively lay down the policies of governments on various issues. When published on defence these become foremost confidence building documents. However in the case of China such reports are always viewed with suspicion. Thus when China produced a White Paper at the end of 2006 a number of caustic comments was heard from analysts across the board and particularly in the United States which increasingly views China as a future antagonist power. The fifth in the series since 1998, this is a biennial review which covers amongst other issues the state of the People`s Liberation Army which at 2.3 million troops continues to be numerically potent. A holistic review of China`s Defence White Paper is essential. A snippet analysis of select issues covered in the White Paper is as per succeeding paragraphs. Snippet analysis format is used to focus on the key determining facets of the White Paper as they affect the projected Chinese security inclinations and force development paradigm. (Based on White Paper downloaded from Downloaded from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006.html on 29 January 2007).

The White paper reiterates China`s commitment to, "peace, development and cooperation, China pursues a road of peaceful development, and endeavors to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity". "The world is at a critical stage, moving toward multi-polarity.

But, they also maintain coordination and practical cooperation in their mutual relationships, and draw on each other's strengths. Some major developing countries and regional groupings have grown in power, and the developing world as a whole is becoming stronger". This explains China`s current over drive of engagement of wide range of countries including past and potential rivals India and Japan, ASEAN, nations beyond the immediate geographical periphery in Africa and traditional friends Pakistan and Russia.

The trend is further amplified by an increased focus in China on creating and preferably heading regional alliances thus, "The international community is increasingly facing comprehensive, diverse and complex security threats. The world is not yet peaceful. Political, economic and security problems and geographical, ethnic and religious contradictions are interconnected and complex. --- The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has entered a new stage of substantive growth, contributing to the establishment of a new mode of state-to-state relations. ASEAN has made steady progress in community-building and in talks on establishing free trade areas with other countries. East Asian cooperation, which is conducted mainly through the ASEAN plus China, Japan and the ROK (10+3) channel, has expanded in scope and its institutional building is improving constantly, continuing to play a major role in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The East Asia Summit has provided a new platform for East Asian cooperation. Moreover, significant progress has been made in South Asian regional cooperation. There is improvement in the relations between India and Pakistan." This also possibly denotes China`s area of influence and interest to include the SCO, ASEAN, East Asia and SAARC regions.

The emphasis on technology as the keystone for modernization of the armed forces is indicated by the statement, "At the new stage in the new century, we will take the scientific development outlook as an important guiding principle for the building of national defense and military affairs, vigorously advance the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features, and strive to realize an all-round, coordinated and sustainable development".

Chinese Armed Forces are likely to modernize rapidly and by 2020 will pose a credible advanced information rich force. This is evident from the plan indicated in the White Paper thus, " China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century." 

There is no change to China`s nuclear policy as indicated thus, " China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

The hold of the Communist Party on the PLA was reiterated thus, " China's armed forces are under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC)."

The trend in modernization is denoted by the statement, "The Army is speeding up the upgrading and informationization of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building Army aviation, light mechanized and information countermeasures units." China is already known to have information warfare units. The belief is to develop asymmetrical capabilities. This would provide the PLA the ability to defeat technologically superior forces. 2010 and 2020 are years to benchmark PLA`s progress.

China is extremely sensitive to an intrusive survey of the defence budget. Thus elaborate details have been pictorially portrayed in the White Paper. The sum of it is, "From 1979 to 1989, the average annual increase of defense expenditure was 1.23 percent. However, the defense expenditure actually registered an average annual decrease of 5.83 percent, given the 7.49 percent average annual increase of the consumer price index in the same period. From 1990 to 2005, the average annual increase in defense expenditure was 15.36 percent. As the average annual increase of the consumer price index during the same period was 5.22 percent, the actual average increase in defense expenditure was 9.64 percent." Not many believe that this is the full story of China`s defence spending. Perhaps rightly so, for to modernize a defence force which is twice the strength of the Indian Army and yet transform it into an information centric, RMA based power cannot be achieved in a budget which is just one and half times more than India`s defence budget. While strategic systems are not part of this budget, even nominal accretion in capabilities will need a much larger outlay. 

The above point is amplified by the next quote which states that, "Both the total amount and per-serviceman share of China's defense expenditure is low compared with those of some other countries, particularly major powers. In 2005, China's defense expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan. China's defense expenses per serviceman averaged RMB107,607, amounting to 3.74 percent of that of the United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan." So how does China get a modern armed force at such a low budgetary outlay per soldier. Either these figures are not telling the full story or PLA modernization will not be sustained to develop across the board capabilities. A more detailed review will reveal that the latter may be the actual story. Thus what we may see in 2020 is Chinese armed forces which has niche capabilities, strategic space and missiles, information and cyber warfare and at the same time flaunt a PLA soldier who can launch human wave attacks.

 (SAST FEBRUARY 2007)