2015 – Alternative Outcomes and India’s Military Options

Introduction

            With Presidential Elections on 20 August, Afghanistan is at another cusp of the stability-instability dyad in its long and turbulent history. The very fact that the elections had to be postponed from 20 May is indicative of continuing instability in the country mainly affecting the South and the East. Linkages of Afghanistan with Pakistan with a mislaid Durand Line, Talibanisation of the vast Pashtun tribal lands and duplicity of Islamabad have led to growing concerns of stability in the country. On the other hand there are some positive outcomes with international commitment, resolve of leaders as Karzai, aid and assistance bringing about a slow but perceptible change. India is a major stake holder in Afghanistan. Envisaging the future outcomes in the country would therefore be of immense interest to Indian security.

Background

            International engagement in Afghanistan has been long standing. Particularly from 2006, there is increased focus on security and development in Afghanistan. The United States in its quest for eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership is committed for now in the region. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said most recently at the Council for Foreign Relations, “In Afghanistan and Pakistan, our goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies, and to prevent their return to either country”. However US commitment is not likely to be long standing as the Secretary of Defence Mr Robert Gates indicated almost at the same time that the American people were tired of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

            Given the past history of Afghanistan, as, “the graveyard of empires” in Kiplingesque lore, there are increased concerns of the War on Terror petering out into another debacle of sorts despite possible proclamation of, “victory” by the participants. The Taliban is waiting just such a turn of events, yet a fault line situation can be avoided by sustained commitment of the international community to the welfare and security of the Afghan people. An outline analysis of the possible alternative outcomes in the country over the next half a decade or so should provide a better understanding of the perils that lie ahead.

Why 2015?

            The selection of the benchmark of 2015 needs some explanation. The third round of elections in Afghanistan for the Presidential as well as Loya Jirga would be hopefully concluded by then and a clear picture of political stability/instability would emerge. The security and economic deficit will be redressed possibly favourably or otherwise. While the principal player the United States would also be examining a possible legacy of President Obama with a second term if he succeeds in gaining so culminating by 2016. In other areas in the region as Pakistan in particular some clarity of the situation either way would also be feasible.

Present State of Conflict and Institution Building

            A brief review of the present state of conflict and institution building is necessary. The Afghan government is making some progress though may not be satisfactory under the circumstances with problems of corruption and lack of permeation of central authority to the periphery.  The US surge and changed of rules of engagement with the people as the centre of gravity is showing better response from the grass roots, though a fair assessment will take some more time. NATO forces have also adopted a more congruent counter militancy strategy reducing use of air power. Civilian surge has yet to be implemented due to problems of finding the right people. Coalition remains in tact but combat commitment is restricted to a handful of countries led by the US.

            The Taliban is largely intact and active split in various groups Quetta Shura, Southern and Northern Command, Haqqani Network, Hizb e Islami and networked with drug and criminal gangs, supported by the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan or TTP and the Pakistani establishment. There are however serrations within especially between the local and central leadership. The main tactics are that of IEDs which is proving highly effective. It has also developed the capacity for complex terrorist attacks combining two or three suicide bombers with fire assault by a number of fighters in Kabul and other regional headquarters. The perception of control varies from 30-35 to 70 percent.

            On the other hand Pakistan has under taken counter militancy operations in the Malakand Agency including Swat, Buner and Dir which has swept away the Taliban. The second phase is likely to be in South Waziristan. The operations have been certified by the Americans as effective but there are many caveats. The complex counter militancy strategy – kinetic operations, targeting leadership, tribal militias, peace deals and local agreements being followed does not create confidence of success with attacks on NATO/ISAF convoys continuing. Thus on the whole the commitment is highly suspect.

            There is greater engagement by Russia with President Medvedev holding a tripartite meet with Afghan and Pakistan President and amenability for opening the Northern route.  Iran remains in political flux.  China with the recent eruption of ethnic conflict in Xingjian lacks a clear security policy and may restrict to economic engagement. India’s substantial contribution through visible aid and assistance though hampered by Pakistan’s objections is a success story. It is a matter of national interest for us now with  Af-Pak region the base of global and regional terrorism with presence of international terrorist groups as the Al Qaeda, Taliban, Lashkar e Taiyyaba, Jaish e Mohammad and other UN proscribed non state actors as Jamaat ud Dawa. Thus our engagement in Afghanistan will have to continue apace

Alternative Outcomes - 2015

            While a number of alternative outcomes can be envisaged, three relatively uncomplicated scenarios are being discussed as follows:-

(a) I - Growing Stability - Most Favoured Outcome.

(b) II – Status Quo – More of the same or continuance of existing scenario in marginally different forms.

(c) III – Failed state moving towards anarchy. This would be a worst case scenario.

            Details of each outcome along with contours, drivers and the spoilers are being discussed as per succeeding paragraphs to portray possibilities in the years ahead.

Most Favoured Outcome - 2015 Growing Stability - Green

            The most favoured outcome in Afghanistan is what can be described as Growing Stability, which can also be called as the Green option. While the endeavour of the international community is to seek full scale stability in the country, which is the most favourable outcome, this is not likely given the current situation. Thus growing stability may be a more realistic alternative by 2015.

            The constituents of this scenario would possibly include, functioning central and regional governments, neutralization of Taliban restricting it to 10 to 15 percent of territory. Increase in the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police to control areas independent of support by international forces would also be evident in this scenario. Concomitantly neutralization of support bases of internationally known terrorist groups operating in Af-Pak region such as Al Qaeda, Taliban, Lashkar E Taiyyaba and so on should have been successfully carried out or increasingly in progress with effective neutralization or assimilation of these groups in the mainstream. There would be greater consensus on a regional or international cooperative political/security regime the exact contours of which cannot be envisaged at present.  Development of institutions economic, security, governance and civil society will show some progress finally resulting in marginal reduction of external dependence for security, economy and development.

            The key trends denoting this scenario would be international commitment led by the US and growing regional commitment with key actors being Russia, India, China, Iran, Central Asian republics and the most important one Pakistan. Pakistan’s commitment to dismantle Al Qaeda-Taliban-LeT Network and shift of the national security objective of, “Strategic Depth”, to internal security and regional harmony would be essential for this purpose.

            The key attribute would however be that of resolve of Afghan leadership and commitment of Afghanistan people. Without the same it is unlikely that other factors would work, on the other hand a synergy between other factors may well lead to greater resolve in the people thus these issues are interlinked. Planned exit of ISAF with gradual build up of the Afghan National Army/Police would add to forward progress of this scenario. India would continue to remain one of the key providers of aid and assistance as required by the people of Afghanistan.

            On the other hand in case of a decline in international consensus due to lack of domestic support, rise in casualties and Pakistan’s continued fostering of strategic depth would lead to limited progress on the security front. Similarly there is a difficulty of harmonising national interests of multiple regional and global players. Thus the challenges to the green or growing stability scenario are many.

Status Quo – 2015 – More of the Same

            Continuing instability without any significant up tick or deterioration of the situation would denote a status quo or a status quo plus/ minus. While there is great hope that the surge of US troops in Afghanistan would lead to improvement of the security situation in a year or so if the situation plateaus, status quo would be the most likely scenario.

            In such a situation the Afghan central government will continue to struggle for establishment of authority in the provinces. Governance would remain Kabul centric with the Taliban writ between 20 to less than 50 percent of the territory and international commitment uncertain. The on – off approach towards neutralisation of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan would denote that operations would be sporadic depending on international pressure or receipt of doles from the United States. The Afghan security forces may remain weak and dependent on international support requiring continued deployment of ISAF which also may show a declining resolve.

            Thus the key trends would denote middling international commitment and lack of regional pledges to support Afghanistan. If Pakistan remains ambivalent and the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership are not impacted by operations in Af-Pak their disruptive capabilities would continue to be a cause of concern. As resolve of Afghan leadership wavers the Afghanistan people would also remain skeptical of success. This sentiment may gain ground due to continued corruption and parochialism, weak Afghan National Army and Police leading to disenchantment of the people due to overall failure of governance. This remains a central theme even now, yet if the situation fails to improve, the patience of the Afghan people may run out. Under the situation a decline in aid and assistance by international community may only add to further deterioration which would contribute to the worst case scenario as discussed in the subsequent paragraph.

Least Favoured Outcome – Continuing Instability leading to Anarchy

            While it may not be difficult to imagine Afghanistan as a failed state, given considerable progress achieved thus far and greater international and regional involvement it would be reasonable to assume that continuing instability leading to anarchy may be a more reasonable possibility. Failure to build institutions and indigenous sustenance of economy combined with continued existence of bases of internationally known terrorist groups in Af-Pak region will lead to anarchy in the long run. The form of anarchy is not very clear at present but in such a situation Af-Pak region will remain matrix of regional and global terrorism.

            The key factors would be forced exit of US troops, weakening of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, failure of regional consensus or an intra regional conflict, Pakistan’s resumption of overt support to Al Qaeda and Taliban and continuous threat to Afghan leadership leading to failure of resolve. This may finally result in disenchantment of Afghanistan people. The global financial crisis may also reduce commitment thereby seeing a breakdown of international consensus leading to continuing instability in the country.

India’s Military Options

            India’s options as envisaged will be covered in outline given that other speakers will follow. In case of any issues left unaddressed, these will be covered during the discussion. However a key issue of interest is the military option. The pre conditions envisaged for India to consider the military option are as follows:-

(a) The issue should be considered of vital interest.

(b) National consensus for commitment for a long haul.

(c) International consensus for commitment.

(d) Trained and operationally ready force.

(e) Logistics sustainability.

(f) 100 percent chance of success.

            Given the current situation Indian troop deployment in Afghanistan would not meet the criteria’s above and therefore is not recommended. However India could assist in training and building the Afghan National Army and police expanding the present engagement. The manner in which this is to be done can be evolved through mutual consultation; the Pakistan factor may dictate a step by step approach with muted commitments. However given capacities which India has for training, this could be a viable option.

            The other area is that of providing management expertise on security in organisation of forces, their training and related issues. For instance there is considerable scope for integrated organisation of Afghan National Army and the police so that troops who are demobilizing from the army could well join the police on voluntary basis. Similarly assistance in capitalisation of the armed forces through provision of helicopters, heavy weapons and equipment is another option which could well be exercised. The Dhruv and Cheetal helicopter for instance have demonstrated good capability in high altitude terrain with difficult meteorological conditions and would be ideal for the rough terrain in Afghanistan which would be available at much lower costs. This facet could be explored. Thus alternative security assistance patterns would have to be evolved which are acceptable by the international and regional community for Indian engagement in this sphere.  

Conclusion

            Afghanistan requires continued support by the international community for a long period as the state lacks institutions and resources. Stability will have to be a joint international and regional priority as no single country or group of countries can be successful. Thus a coordinated international and regional effort is necessary to reduce the role of state and non state spoilers and ensure that Pakistan does not fall into the self destructive trap of strategic depth in Afghanistan

[Based on presentation made at a seminar on GEOPOLITICAL CONTEST IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA’S INTERESTS at Asia Centre Bangalore on 25 July 2009].